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Executive Summary
Although the telecommunications sector in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the mobile market, has 
experienced significant growth, outcomes have been sub-optimal in many respects. While some 
markets, such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, are very dynamic, as a whole Africa continues 
to lag behind other regions both in terms of the percentage of people with access to the full range 
of communications services and the amounts and manner in which they can be used – primarily as 
a result of the high cost of services. The cost of wholesale telecommunication services as an input 
for other economic activities remains high, escalating the cost of business in most countries. In 
addition, the contribution of ICT to gross domestic product, with some exceptions in North Africa, 
Senegal and the Indian Ocean island states, is considerably less than global averages and what it 
would be if it were being used more widely as a lever for economic growth on the continent.
In many of the 17 countries in this review, the national objectives of achieving universal and affordable 
access to the full range of communications services have been undermined either by poor policies 
constraining market entry and the competitive allocation of available resources; weak institutional 
arrangements with a dearth of technical capacity and competencies; and, in some instances, 
regressive taxes on usage. As a general trend across the continent, while the voice divide is 
decreasing, the Internet divide is increasing and broadband is almost absent on the continent.
The fixed-line sector continues to show no signs of recovery as most countries experienced negative 
growth between 2006 and 2008. Failure to privatise the fixed-line segments, extended monopolies 
when privatisation took place, and ineffectual regulation of the incumbent, usually dominant at least 
in the backbone of most countries, if no longer in voice, account for low penetration rates. These, 
together with sequencing problems in the policy, the delayed establishment of autonomous 
regulators, and the failure to open up markets prior to privatisation with associated high prices, have 
undermined the extension of fixed services. This is in the face of rapidly deployable wireless 
technologies by new market entrants where markets were opened, with innovative pricing that 
tapped into the demand for low access charges and small denomination pre-paid purchasing 
vouchers, making it very difficult for fixed networks with huge sunk costs and high access prices to 
compete both on cost and the mobility of new phone services.
The trend across the countries under review indicates a decline in the number of fixed lines. Even 
while being earmarked for over a decade as the network and service to facilitate universal access, 
fixed-line operators have not been able to meet basic communication needs. In cases where fixed 
lines are available, such as in urban areas, they are yet limited and of poor quality. With a few 
exceptions, such as Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia – which shows marginal improvements –
fixed line penetration figures are static or declining, with most countries’ penetration rates standing 
at less than 3% of the population. The low penetration of fixed lines, however, has created 
opportunities for ‘fixed-mobile’ CDMA operators to provide wireless local loop services.
While mobile penetration figures have doubled or even tripled since 2006 (making it the fastest 
growing region in the world according to the International Telecommunications Union), these are 
mostly off very low bases. Mobile penetration levels in many countries remain below the 40% 
critical mass believed to trigger the network effects associated with economic growth. Of course 
several notable exceptions can be found in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tunisia and South Africa, many of 
which are perceived to be reaching maturity. However, when supply-side data on the number of 
SIM-cards is critically analysed, it is evident that the equation of SIM cards with subscribers or 
percentage of the population, as in tele-density measures, is problematic. The high ‘penetration’ 
figures result form the use of multiple-SIM cards, resulting in over-counting, often by several million. 
Despite over-counting, growth in the mobile segment is indisputably high, though uneven, across 
all countries. This can be attributed to a number of factors including the rise in the number of 
operators; intense competition in some markets, which has driven down mobile prices; the 
proliferation of low cost handsets; operator network expansion; and the introduction of 
differentiated products. This has allowed for the entry of previous non-consumers into the markets, 
while constantly provide new services for the top end of the market which drives the uptake of 
new services.
Mobile operators are also leaders in innovation at an applications level, particularly in the 
development of value added services like mobile payments, which has become a necessary 
offering to avoid churn and ensure customer loyalty. Although the mobile telephony is the fastest 
growing segment, affordability of services remains a challenge. Mobile penetration rates continue 
to demonstrate significant growth but these figures tend to mask the fact that millions of Africans 
still do not own their own means of communication. Despite the high proliferation of low costs 
handsets, in some poorer sub-Saharan African countries like Uganda and Tanzania penetration 
remains relatively low. While improved affordability of devices is driving up take, pricing of services 
remain a constraint on the usage, particularly when these are effected by the regressive special 
taxes levied on communications and equipment, which is as high as 30% in Uganda. As such the 
negative effect of taxes on affordable access is one of the key issues on the regulatory agenda.
At a continental level, sub-Saharan Africa trails North Africa on a range of indicators, with fixed-line 
penetration as high as 32% in some North African countries and Internet penetration greater than 
40% as a result of the deployment of mobile wireless technologies (OECD 2008). In sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Internet market is in its infancy, with penetration rates still below 3% on average, though 
a greater percentage gain access through public access points. Broadband uptake trails even other 
developing regions in the world with a penetration rate below 2%. Tunisia had the highest rate with 
34.07%, followed by Nigeria with 28.43%. Kenya, Uganda and South Africa had between 7% and 
10%. The broadband market is nascent with penetration rates lower than 1% across the continent 
Tunisia, again, was the broadband leader among the countries under review.
Low penetration rates are mainly a result of the prohibitively high costs of Internet services. 
Unsurprisingly therefore the countries in which Internet penetration appears to be moderately 
higher are those with higher GDP per capita – where a significant number of people can absorb the 
high start up and usage costs. A major reason for the high cost of bandwidth is due to the limited 
transmission networks – both undersea cables and terrestrial backbone – as a result of policies of 
the protection of monopolies and their ineffective regulation.
This lack of backbone infrastructure and high cost of access to the Internet have been the major 
barriers to telecoms market growth. The landing of several undersea cables and a number of 
terrestrial fibre investment projects have led to a significant reduction in the costs of accessing the 
Internet. In some countries, the drop in wholesale prices has not, however, filtered to end-user 
prices. In South Africa, for example, existing customers have been provided with increased 
bandwidth for existing subscriber prices, which are high by international standards. Though 
welcomed by those already online, from a policy perspective this is unlikely to fuel the uptake of 
Internet and particularly broadband services which are so dismally behind other developing 
regions. Further, the demand-side challenges, such as digital literacy and the affordability of access 
devices like personal computers, is expected to remain a challenge.
While such outcomes reflect in many instances policy and regulatory failure, there have been some 
positive policy and regulatory developments on the continent with regard to the stimulation of 
investment through the opening of markets, the introduction of service-neutral licensing regimes, 
and the effective regulation of areas critical for ensuring successful entry into the market by new 
entrants and fair competition, in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania.
There have been a number of call-termination-rate-determinations by regulators across the 
countries surveyed. The leverage of the resulting interconnection price reductions by new entrants 
in some countries, most recently Kenya, has been dramatic. In many other jurisdictions, despite 
considerable cuts in termination prices, these have not translated into lower retail prices. Instead 
most countries are characterised by high retail and wholesale prices, which continue to undermine 
policy objectives of universal access to affordable services and inhibit the potential of business 
process outsourcing opportunities and negatively affect the cost of business in most countries. In 
addition, the autonomy of regulatory bodies has been constrained by institutional arrangements 
and political processes negatively influencing regulatory outcomes.
Although growth in Africa’s ICT sector has been driven by the private sector over the last decade 
and a half and by inward investments from high-income countries, with the onset of the global 
economic slow-down investment from high-income countries has declined. Instead there has been 
new multinational investment from emerging economies such as China and India. Investment in 
telecommunications access networks has been largely focused on wireless-based communications 
with limited investment in the fixed-line sector.
In order to address the limited investment in the much needed backbone infrastructure to provide 
seamless communications services, in many countries the state is playing an active role in 
attracting private investors through pubic-private partnerships, supplier sponsored concessions as 
in Uganda, supplier sponsored loans from the Chinese Import and Export Bank as in Ethiopia or 
investing in itself as in South Africa.
Telecommunications reform on the continent has been uneven as have been the results. Despite 
African countries committing to the alignment of their markets and regulatory institutions with 
international reform trends, this is only the case and partially so in many of the markets reviewed. 
While several formally acceded over a decade ago to the World Trade Organisation General 
Agreement on Trade and Services Annex on telecommunication, there has often been greater 
rhetorical commitment to the process of separating policy, regulation and operations between the 
government, regulatory agency and the operator than there has been in practice.
Likewise, although 93% of African countries have established a regulator, the absence of political 
autonomy to regulate independently and capacity to regulate effectively is the main obstacle for a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and accountable regulation of the market. Instead, in many of the 
countries regulation of the telecommunications sector is marred by institutional failure, whether at 
the policy or regulatory level. Despite this obstacle, several of the countries reviewed, such as 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania to some degree, have managed to liberalise their markets by 
eliminating restrictions to market entry, or to regulate effectively enough to start reaping some of 
the benefits of competition.
As a result, the perception of the telecommunications regulatory environment in most countries 
reviewed tends to be negative, as indicated in the second part of this report. The uncertainty 
surrounding the regulatory environment consequently heightens perceptions of regulatory risk 
and impacts negatively on investment decisions.
In a converging and competitive infrastructure market, the emerging policy and regulatory challenges 
relate to the regulation of anti-competitive behaviour and to the establishment of licensing regimes 
that can accommodate next generation networks and services. In most jurisdictions these are 
primarily dealt with by the sector regulator, but in some countries, such as South Africa and Namibia, 
competition issues have to be addressed jointly with a competition authority.
With regard to emerging licensing regimes, although the African telecommunications market has 
not been fully liberalised and privatised in many instances, regulators are implementing unified 
licensing regimes in order to accommodate the convergence of technology. As competition 
intensifies and the uptake of wireless-based communications increases, the efficient management 
of spectrum represent a major challenge and priority for the regulator. The lack of access to 
spectrum limits the expansion activities of operators and deployment of new services such as 
wireless broadband. Newer, more efficient methods of spectrum allocation, such as auctions, are 
also receiving priority.
The opening up of markets regionally. most successfully in East Africa, has enabled business 
innovations, such as mobile banking which has proliferated there, providing some relief to the 
unbanked, but which will require the coordination of financial and telecommunication frameworks 
if further innovations are to be enabled. The progressive regulatory framework also enabled the 
global innovation of the regional roaming-free service pioneered by the mobile operator Zain, 
through treatment of it's contiguous national network as an integrated market. This strategy has 
been replicated by other operators across the African continent. However, national pricing still 
hampers the accessibility of mobile services. Tariffs are not only influenced by the number of 
players and level of competition, but regulatory aspects such as interconnection fees, taxes and 
levies increase the costs of telecommunication services. As a result, in terms of policy outcomes, 
large numbers of citizens across the continent still lack access to, or cannot afford, the kind of 
communication services that enable effective social and economic participation in a modern 
economy and society.
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Despite the significant growth of mobile communication across the continent, which has brought 
communications services to millions of people for the first time, Africa as a region lags behind the 
rest of the world on a whole set of ICT indicators. With regards to Internet connectivity and 
particularly broadband, Africa’s connectivity barely shows on global geographic indicator maps 
outside of South Africa and North Africa, with South Africa only just making a showing.
And from a policy perspective there is a paradox to increased connectivity. As more and more 
individuals connect to the range of enhanced information and communications services offered by 
converged broadband IP-based services, the digital divide between them and those who remain 
unconnected gets wider and wider. The competitiveness of countries in which those individuals 
who are connected and those in which they are not gets wider. Finally, the regions in which 
connected countries fall are better able to harness the benefits of regional integration and improve 
their competitiveness, increasing the gap between them and other less connected regions.
This paper seeks to examine some of the factors that contribute to the different policy outcomes by 
comparing the sector performance in 17 African countries, their contribution to regional 
integration and global competitiveness and any policy, regulatory and institutional constraints on 
them doing so. Access and pricing are used as key policy outcomes to assess the effectiveness of 
policy and regulation in realising national and regional objectives of affordable access to 
communications services.
This review starts with an overview of the role of telecommunications in the macroeconomic 
environment of various African countries and highlights the role of ICTs in economic growth. When 
comparing the contribution of ICT to GDP across regions it is evident that generally ICT contributes 
a higher percentage to GDP in countries that have higher levels of GDP per capita. However, within 
the countries under review, countries such as Senegal, with a GDP per capita way below many of 
the other countries, has been able to leverage the contribution of ICTs to GDP, doubling its rates, 
from 5% to nearly 10% in three years, and outstripping the 17 other countries reviewed.
This is followed by a review of the policy and regulatory developments in Africa. These are highly 
uneven across the continent. While there have been considerable gains in some countries, such as 
those in East Africa, Namibia and Botswana, the move towards cost-based termination rates and to 
a lesser degree tariff regulation, the cost of communications nevertheless remains high. This has 
placed it out of reach of the general African population or resulted in only limited usage, 
undermining the policy objectives of affordable access and the construction of information 
societies and knowledge economies. In addition, sector-specific policies such as universal service 
levies and special taxes on ICT equipment and services tend to drive up the costs of services. 
Wholesales charges for leased lines and international bandwidth continue to be way above cost, as 
are interconnection rates in most countries, making them expensive input into businesses and 
contributing to high prices for end users.
The second section presents the results of the regulatory perception survey conducted in the 17 
countries and against which the performance of the ICT sector in each country in the first part is 
considered. While there have been successes in the African telecommunications market, and some 
significant regulatory interventions in some countries, the general perception of the 
telecommunications policy and regulatory environment on the continent continues to be negative. 
In many cases, what is attributed to the failure of the regulatory actions, most fundamentally 
market entry, the main driver of competitive growth within the sector, are in fact policy constraints 
over which the regulator has no or little say. Likewise, the regulatory failure attributed the regulator 
often reflects the institutional arrangements and political constraints on its autonomy, for which it is 
also not responsible. Clearly, if Africa is to meet the central policy objective of providing accessible 
and affordable communications services to its citizens, governments are challenged to establish 
autonomous and publicly accountable regulatory regimes that are adequately resourced and 
skilled to regulate this dynamic sector effectively.
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As more and more 
individuals connect to 
the range of enhanced 
information and 
communications 
services offered by 
converged broadband 
IP-based services, the 
digital divide between 
them and those who 
remain unconnected 
gets wider and wider.
Sector Contribution to Economy
In recognition of the role ICT plays in stimulating economic growth and development, some 
African countries have adopted ICT-led development policies and are undergoing reforms in 
order to stimulate foreign investment in infrastructure. This has included the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector, which has opened up markets to increased competition, providing 
subscribers with access to a wider variety of services and contributing significantly to the 
national economy.1
The input cost of communications into 
other services and industries remains high 
in most countries however, and continues 
to be a barrier to broader industry 
investment and improved growth through 
the deployment of competitively priced 
communication services to improve the 
efficient supply of goods and services.
The arrival of several undersea projects like 
Seacom, which became operational in 
mid-2009, and Eassy in 2010, has 
significantly driven down bandwidth costs 
and improved the affordability of Internet 
services. The undersea cable projects have 
been accompanied by terrestrial national 
and cross-border infrastructure projects 
which have increased the impact of 
undersea cables on the pricing of Internet 
access. With the arrival of competition at 
the international level, international prices 
are becoming less expensive than national 
transmission tariffs. There are extensive 
plans by the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) to connect the 
interior of the continent to the cables. 
Mobile operators, unwilling to wait for 
these and other backbones to be built out, 
are playing a key role in the rollout of the 
fibre backbone infrastructure.
Despite Africa’s GDP growth rate decreasing from 6.1% in 2007 to 5.7% in 2008 in line with the 
global economic slowdown, the ICT sector has continued to grow in line with global trends.2
Table 1 presents the GDP per capita across selected countries in Africa between 2005 and 2008. 
Table 3 below presents telecommunications revenue as a percentage of GDP. As demonstrated by 
economic research over the last two decades there appears to be a correlation between countries 
that have a higher per capita GDP and the countries in which telecommunications contributes a 
greater percentage to GDP, such as South Africa and Kenya (Roller and Waverman 2001).
The 2010 Network Readiness Index (NRI) developed by the World Economic Forum measures the 
propensity for countries to exploit the opportunities offered by information and communications 
technology and the impact of ICT on the competitiveness of nations. The substantial growth that 
has nevertheless been seen in the ICT sector in Africa over the last decade has been driven largely 
by the private sector. Most African countries experienced an economic slow down in 2008, while 
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1 Michael, E. B.(2008). The Role of Telecommunication Infrastructure in the Regional Economic Growth of Africa. 
Available online: http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/12431/1/Telecommunication_in_Africa_Enowbi.pdf 
(Accessed May 2010).
2 African Economic Outlook (2008). Available online: http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/





towards the cost of 
an efficient operator.
Table 1: GDP per capita in US $ current
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Botswana 5716.3 5902.1 6522.3 6982.2
South Africa 5177.8 5438.3 5929.8 5678.0
Namibia 3614.5 3896.2 4231.1 4149.0
Tunisia 2888.4 3057.1 3424.8 3903.0
Nigeria 796.8 1018.0 1123.2 1369.7
Zambia 619.1 901.4 1001.5 1251.9
Cameroon 930.7 984.6 1108.6 1225.7
Cote d'Ivoire 850.3 882.8 983.7 1137.1
Senegal 770.1 808.9 951.8 1087.0
Kenya 523.2 611.9 718.4 783.0
Benin 545.0 582.5 660.8 771.2
Ghana 489.2 568.1 653.3 713.2
Burkina Faso 394.8 405.7 459.7 521.7
Tanzania 373.1 367.6 419.5 496.4
Rwanda 265.7 307.8 360.9 458.5
Uganda 313.6 334.6 400.9 452.5
Mozambique 315.8 332.3 367.8 439.9
Ethiopia 164.8 197.9 243.7 317.0
(Source: World Bank, Data database 2010)
high-income countries like the United Kingdom and USA entered into a recessionary phase. As a 
result, foreign direct investment flows into the African telecommunications market from high-
income countries declined in 2009. This was followed by an emergence and strengthening of new 
investors from more robust emerging economies, particularly India and China. For instance, in 
March 2010 Bharti-Airtel, an Indian company, acquired most of Zain Africa’s operations for $10.7 
billion, after failed merger talks in 2009 with MTN Africa’s largest mobile operator.3





Overall Government Business Individual
Mauritius 53 42 45 75 77 66 70
South Africa 62 39 84 76 71 44 89
Senegal 75 82 47 83 64 64 96
Gambia 77 72 52 91 72 89 97
Botswana 86 65 86 97 90 97 95
Namibia 89 54 104 104 122 81 98
Kenya 90 91 81 92 74 69 111
Mali 96 101 83 106 73 108 122
Zambia 97 92 98 107 78 105 118
Ghana 98 89 87 120 119 123 113
Nigeria 99 97 94 102 113 83 105
Cote d'Ivoire 104 117 95 101 94 84 114
Lesotho 107 96 110 115 116 98 119
Burkina Faso 108 100 112 117 89 116 128
Benin 111 107 114 112 99 119 116
Uganda 115 102 124 113 103 109 117
Mozambique 116 114 115 118 96 110 126
Malawi 119 93 125 123 98 120 129
Tanzania 120 103 123 122 112 114 124
Madagascar 121 119 118 111 101 103 123
Ethiopia 122 127 96 128 108 127 132
Cameroon 128 126 127 116 111 107 115
Burundi 129 131 120 132 127 115 133
Zimbabwe 132 130 131 133 133 129 120
Chad 133 133 130 131 125 102 130
(Source: WEF - World Economic Forum 2010)
Comparative Sector Performance Review 2009/2010
3
3 World Economic Forum (2010). The Global Technology Report 2009–2010. Available online:
http://www.weforum.org/documents/GITR10/index.html (Accessed May 2010) The NRI is comprised of three 
components, namely the environment for ICT offered by a given country or community, the readiness of the 
community’s key stakeholders (individuals, businesses, and governments) to use ICT, and finally the usage of ICT 
amongst these stakeholders
ICT Policy & Regulatory Issues
Within the context of wider global governance frameworks of multilateral agencies such as the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World 
Bank, and continental agencies such as the African Union (AU), most countries have embarked on 
reforming their ICT sector to align with global developments.
Regional Policy & Regulatory Co-ordination
Throughout Africa regional economic communities (REC) have increasingly focused on ICT policy and 
regulatory development as part of regional growth strategies. One of the main objectives of the 
regional bodies is to harmonise national ICT policy and legal frameworks within regional blocs. 
Regional harmonisation of ICT policy and regulation is recognised by regional communities and the 
international donor community as essential to regional economic integration and the integration of 
regional economies into the global economy. The underlying principles around which harmonisation 
is being pursued, are to bring about effective competition in the telecommunications market, to 
interconnect national networks for the development of a seamless African backbone infrastructure, 
and to promote regional and foreign direct investments. However, at present regional economic 
integration based on single markets with harmonised ICT policies has yet to be realised. In order to 
establish similar ICT policy goals, RECs created model policy guidelines as a starting point for regional 
harmonisation. Member states are expected use these guidelines to create their own national policy 
frameworks (Maitland and van Gorp, 2009).
Table 3: ICT Policy Initiatives
Organisation Document Year
African Union Reference Framework for Harmonisation of 
Telecommunication and ICT policies and regulations
2008
East African Community, East 
African Regulatory, Postal and 
Telecommunications
Guidelines on Interconnection and access for 
telecommunications networks and services within the 
East African Community
2008
A Study of Policy Harmonisation for East African 
Community
2009
A study of regulatory harmonisation for EAC 2009
Economic Community of West 
African States
Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/07 on the harmonisation of 
policies and regulatory framework for the ICT sector
2007
SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications & Meteorology 1997
Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS)
Recommendations to develop a regional framework for 
harmonising national policies and regulations
2009
Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC)
Six directives on ICT policy harmonisation, universal 
service, interconnection, tariffs and data protection
2008
RECs in Africa usually have a similar policymaking structure within which a sector-specific 
committee addresses issues related to ICTs, with the aim of implementing harmonised ICT policy 
and regulatory frameworks at a national level. Nonetheless, the main activities of regional 
associations of regulators are knowledge sharing and capacity building rather than legally binding 
harmonisation of policies. Furthermore, they have little or no implementation powers, which lie 
with national regulators. At a continental level, the African Union (AU) leads the process of 
harmonising the ICT policy and regulatory framework. The Reference Framework for Harmonisation 
of Telecommunication and ICT policies and regulations in Africa was adopted in May 2008, and 
endorsed by Summit in July of the same year. During the AU assembly in Addis Ababa on February 
2010, the commitment to intensify activities to implement the Reference Framework was renewed 
once again. The Reference Framework is implemented through the ITU/EC project Harmonisation 
of the ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa (HIPSSA).4
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4 During the period analysed (2009/2010) the ITU was involved in several projects with a total budget of USD 13 
billion. Most of the technical assistance projects have a continental scope and are aimed at developing a 
harmonised ICT policy and regulatory framework. See the HIPSSA website, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/
ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/
At a regional level, both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Southern African Development Community regions have already established legal and regulatory 
measures to harmonise their own ICT policy frameworks. In the ECOWAS, the ITU supported the 
REC to develop best practice guidelines with the aim of encouraging the establishment of an 
integrated ICT market in West Africa. In the SADC region the process of ICT policy harmonisation 
began with the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (1997). The 
document represents the first legal and policy framework for harmonising ICT policy at a regional 
level in Africa, but was not reviewed for over a decade. At the moment, with the support by the ITU, 
SADC is in the process of updating the current guidelines to align them to industry developments 
such as the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications licensing models, taking into 
account technology-neutral licensing, Next Generation Networks (NGN), roaming, interconnection 
and tariffs. It also aims to create new additional guidelines related to cyber-security, a regional 
digital broadcasting migration plan, model dispute resolution, and competition policy.
Members of the East Africa Community (EAC) discussed plans for regional ICT policy harmonisation. 
However, in this region the process of ICT policy harmonisation has been retarded due to a 
sentiment among members that a harmonised ICT policy framework would have favoured Kenya, 
the leading country in the region. Since telecommunications markets in the EAC were amongst the 
earliest in Africa to open to competition, and since the EAC markets have been historically 
integrated, the REC is now in the process of determining if and how a single regulation policy can 
be applied uniformly.5
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in June 2009 adopted recommendations 
to develop a regional framework for harmonising national policies and regulations. The ECCAS has a 
consultative body called the Telecommunication Regulators' Association for Central Africa (ARTAC). 
The association contributed to the ICT action plan for Central Africa. In addition, Ministers in charge of 
telecommunication and ICT from the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
adopted six directives on ICT policy harmonisation, universal service, interconnection, tariffs and data 
protection in November 2008. The EU/ITU HIPSSA project is currently conducting a benchmarking 
study to assess the degree to which these have been implemented.
Despite the trend in harmonising ICT policy and regulatory frameworks, the ITU recognises that 
“there is a high degree of heterogeneity among the regions in terms of advancement in the 
harmonisation process” (ITU, 2009). Waema (2005) has identified the challenges in ICT policy and 
regulatory harmonisation as the following:
• existence of multiple ICT policy and programme initiatives, some of which are often in 
competition with each other;
• very little ownership of regional ICT policy and regulatory initiatives from national African 
governments;
• regional organisations’ and institutions’ lack of institutional mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with model policies and frameworks as well as to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation. Member states belonging to the REC are sovereign states with no 
obligations to adopt and adjust national ICT policy and regulatory frameworks to the policy 
guidelines issued by regional bodies; and
• different stages of economic, political and social development make it difficult for member 
countries to have common priorities and therefore to adopt common models or 
frameworks.6
So while considerable resources have been put into establishing and supporting structures for the 
regional integration of markets and harmonisation of ICT policies, there has been limited success in 
implementing harmonisation frameworks to date.
Institutional Reforms
The last decade has also seen institutional rearrangements adjust within the ICT sector to conform 
to international reform trends. The ITU shows, for example, in the 2009 telecom development report 
that 93% of countries in Africa have established regulators. As a result, Africa is the continent with 
the highest number of regulators in the world. These reforms do not, however, appear to equate 
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6 Waema, T. M. (2005). In Etta, F.E. and Elder, L. (eds.), A Brief History of the Development of ICT Policy in Kenya. At 
the Crossroads: ICT Policy Making in East Africa, (pp. 25-43). Nairobi, Kenya: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.
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with regulatory effectiveness, with Africa lagging all other regions in global ICT indices. The 
ineffectiveness of many regulatory agencies across the continent relates to the absence of political 
autonomy to regulate independently. Further, in lamenting the poor levels of policy 
implementation by regulators on the continent, there is often a failure to acknowledge the 
underlying policy constraints on their effectiveness. For example, in Botswana the independent 
regulatory body is in charge of granting operators’ licences autonomously and it finances its 
operational budget without ministerial approval with fees from the sector. Nonetheless, the 
Ministry has the authority to refuse or revoke an operator’s licence as deemed necessary. In order to 
guarantee the separation of functions, traditionally five separate entities have been created under 
the ministry in Kenya: the state-owned fixed-line operator; the regulator; the postal corporation; the 
National Communications Secretariat; and the appeal tribunal for arbitration. On the other hand, in 
Ghana, despite a new ICT law being promulgated in 2008 with the aim, among others, of 
preventing political interference in the regulatory body, the new legal framework has not advanced 
much. And in many instances, like most West African countries reviewed, despite formal separations 
of powers, political pressure is brought to bear on decision-making. In extreme cases like Ethiopia, 
the regulator’s role, which remains within the ministry’s, is limited to monitoring the behaviour of a 
single monopoly incumbent. Several countries, in acknowledgement of the convergence of 
broadcasting and telecommunications, have merged their regulatory authorities in a single 
communications sector regulator. Countries that have done so, in various permutations, include 
Botswana, Ghana, Namibia7, South Africa, and Tanzania.
Liberalisation & Competition
Telecommunications in Africa has become far more dynamic with liberalisation, with the exception of 
Ethiopia which still maintains a government-owned integrated monopoly for mobile, broadband and 
fixed-line services. In Ghana, for example, further operators’ licences have been granted, with five now 
operating, causing mobile prices to plummet over the last two years. Policy and legal frameworks 
support the development of a competitive ICT market in the country based on principles of open 
markets and fair competition. Moreover, the government has reduced its direct involvement in the ICT 
market. With increased competition in across the continent there is a need to control abuse of 
dominance, anti-competitive agreements and anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions. While a 
sector-specific regulatory authority is in charge of ex-ante economic and technical sector regulation, a 
competition authority in general has an ex-post regulatory role, other than mergers and acquisitions, 
and a broader mandate over competition enforcement. Often, however, roles and responsibilities of 
the two authorities overlap, especially in the exercise of economic regulation. Since economic 
regulation, such as granting licences and determining prices might have a direct impact on 
competition, in the absence of clearly defined jurisdictions and mechanisms for co-jurisdiction, the 
entities can fail the sector rather than make it more effective. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) identifies the following scenarios that have been implemented by 
several jurisdictions to resolve conflicting mandates:
• Merge both technical and economic regulation in a sector-specific regulator and leave 
competition enforcement within the competition authority;
• Merge both technical and economic regulation in a sector-specific regulator that can 
enforce competition;
• Merge both technical and economic regulation in a sector-specific regulator and give it 
competition law enforcement functions which have to be performed in co-ordination with 
the competition authority;
• Separate technical regulation as an independent function for the sector regulator and leave 
economic regulation within the competition authority;
• Gather all aspects of regulation and competition law under the control of the competition 
authority.8
The problem with international regulatory blueprints is that they are often drawn from markets far 
more mature and competitive than many of those in Africa. Several of the anti-competitive drivers 
are a result of policy constraints or protectionism that enable and even incentivise an incumbent or 
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October 2010.
8 CUTS International (2008). Competition authorities and sector regulators: what is the best operational 
framework? Available online:http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/Viewpointpaper-
CompAuthoritiesSecRegulators.pdf (Accessed September 2010)
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dominant player to behave uncompetitively. The reality is that sector regulators are likely to be 
required to enable fair competition for a long time, while competition authorities often do not have 
the necessary sector expertise to deal with technical issues in infrastructure industries. Of course, 
sector regulators have also often lacked the skills to regulate effectively, which is why industry has 
lobbied for competition authorities to regulate across the board. Lack of co-ordination between the 
two can encourage ‘forum shopping’, whereby complainants tote their disputes from one forum to 
another to see where they might get the most sympathetic hearing.
Kenya and Zambia have merged both technical and economic regulation in a sector-specific 
regulator with competition law enforcement reflecting the second scenario identified by UNCTAD 
and resulting in a regulatory authority with substantial power not only in technical and economic 
regulation but also in competition issues. South Africa and Namibia, on the other hand, have 
adopted arrangements for the sector that appear to emulate the third scenario identified. In these 
countries competition authorities have co-jurisdictions with the regulator, and the competition 
authorities are specialised in mergers and acquisitions and in anti-competitive practice. In Uganda, 
where the sector has been extensively liberalised, and despite the growth of competition in the 
sector, the dominance of certain players continues to prompt the question of whether existing 
competition provisions exercised by the sector regulator are sufficient to guarantee fair 
competition, or whether a dedicated authority based on competition law is necessary.
Towards a Unified-Licensing Regime
Many African countries are undergoing complex restructuring of ICT policy and regulatory 
frameworks in order to liberalise and privatise the sector. Countries like South Africa, Tanzania, 
Namibia and Uganda created converged regulators, typically with responsibility for regulating the 
broadcasting, telecommunications and postal sectors.
Tanzania is still in the process of integrating legal frameworks related to telecommunications, 
broadcasting and postal services, despite the ratification of an Act specifically developed to address 
convergence issues. South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Botswana have already 
implemented a technology-neutral horizontal licensing framework, but the scope of restructuring the 
telecommunications market is uneven throughout the continent. In these countries, the migration 
from a vertical to horizontal licensing regime is considered a key strategy to address the technological, 
market and service convergence. In these markets, the unified licensing framework is considered as an 
opportunity to increase competition. However, the capacity to implement these changes remains a 
major challenge. In South Africa, after considerable delays by the regulator in implementing the 
onerous transition regime imposed on it by the law in 2006, new entrants finally took it and the 
Minister to court in 2009 and the matter was settled in their favour.9  In Tanzania, the converged 
licensing framework is considered the central strategy around which the market has been fully 
liberalised. The converged licensing framework simplified existing licensing procedures to ease market 
entry. It also ensures regulatory flexibility to address market and technological developments; and 
establishes efficient utilisation of network resources, so that networks may be used to provide a broad 
range of ICT services. In Kenya the regulator replaced the licensing system based on a bidding process 
with an open market-based licensing. The regulator abolished the beauty contest in preference of 
implementing a more accessible licensing framework, on a first come first served basis. A unified 
technology and service-neutral licensing framework has been effective from late 2008. Progressively, it 
permits any form of telecommunications infrastructure to be used to provide any type of 
communications service. The country has introduced this new regime gradually, and has established a 
transition period during which it will issue three types of technology-neutral licences.
In Uganda the separation of the licensing of infrastructure from the service provision increased 
competition in the market. The technology-neutral licensing regime provides the licensee with the 
opportunity to select the technology of their choice to deliver ICT services. With regard to the 
services segment of the ICT market, the licensing framework is based on two types of licences: the 
first allows operators to deliver voice and data services; the second licence is a capacity resale 
licence for resell operations using the capacity of other operators.
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to limit the number of converted ECNS licences on on the directive of the Ministry. It also sought relief from a 
contested prohibition on VANS being able to provide their own network facilities without having to obtain 
these from incumbent licensed telecom network operators such as Telkom or Neotel. The court declared that 
the prohibition on self-provisioning is in direct conflict with the enabling legislation and ordered that all VANS 
operators licensed before the start of the conversion process be allowed to self-provide, in accordance with the 
initial policy direction and the initial interpretation offered by ICASA in 2004.
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In Ghana the licensing regime 
supports widespread market 
e n t r y a n d t h e f r a m e w o r k 
p a r t i a l l y s u p p o r t s s e r v i c e 
neutrality. The licences of the 
telephone companies allow 
them to provide services which 
a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e i r c o r e 
activities, and they only need to 
inform the regulator about their 
intention. A typical example of 
s e r v i c e n e u t r a l i t y i s t h e 
provision of data services by the 
mobile telephone companies in 
the country. In 2006 Botswana, 
with the purpose of enabling 
competition among operators, 
reviewed the licensing structure 
towards a service neutral licence 
to enable competition and 
innovation in the market, and 
Botswana has continued to 
shine with regard to some key 
indicators as a result.
Privatisation
It is evident that the privatisation process in the selected countries (table 5) has been slow. Instead 
the state continues to maintain dominance over fixed-line incumbent operators and often creating 
a structural conflict of interest in the institutional arrangements in terms of their broader policy 
mandate for the sector, and indeed their competitors.






Botswana BTC 100% http://www.btc.bw/
Burkina Faso Onatel 100% http://www.mbendi.com/indy/cotl/tlcm/af/bf/
p0005.htm
Cameroon Camtel 100% http://www.mbendi.com/indy/cotl/tlcm/af/ca/
p0005.htm
Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Telecom 49% ttp://www.mbendi.com/orgs/cht6.htm
Ethiopia ETC 100% http://www.ethionet.et/aboutus/
companyprofile.html




Kenya Telkom Kenya 49% http://allafrica.com/stories/200801080875.htm
Mozambique TDM 100% http://www.mbendi.com/indy/cotl/tlcm/af/mz/
p0005.htm
Namibia Telecom Namibia 100% http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSLDE62I0WS20100319
Nigeria Nitel (Transcorp) 25% But 75% reclaimed in 2006 after failure of equity 
partners to meet obligations and currently bid by 
Omen International Consortium (Cellular News 2010)
Rwanda Rwanda Tel http://www.rwandatel.rw/?-History-
Senegal Orange Senegal 17,28%
South Africa Telkom South Africa 39,80% https://secure1.telkom.co.za/ir/sustainability/
shareholding/shareholding.jsp
Tanzania TTCL 36% http://www.ttcl.co.tz/about_history.asp
Tunisia Tunisie Télécom 100% http://www.zawya.com/cm/profile.cfm/cid337471
Uganda Uganda Telecom 31% http://www.utl.co.ug/utl.php?i=75
Zambia Yes Yes
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Cameroon Not converged No 
Côte d’Ivoire
Ethiopia No regulator No 
Ghana Yes No 
Kenya Yes Technologically neutral
Mozambique Not converged Technologically neutral
Namibia Yes Yes
Nigeria Yes Yes
Rwanda No No 
Senegal Yes Yes
South Africa Yes Yes
Tanzania Yes Technologically neutral
Tunisia Not converged Technologically neutral
Uganda Not converged Technologically neutral
Zambia Yes Yes
Spectrum Management
Efficient spectrum allocation is one of the primary enablers for rapid wireless deployment of 
services. With the advent of wireless broadband and the likelihood of dependence on wireless in 
the large-scale absence of fixed infrastructure, making available spectrum at fair value has become 
a key policy and regulatory issue. Open access regimes, which enable wireless service access to 
backbone and other critical facilities, are vital to optimising available technologies to extend 
communications services.
In Ethiopia, where the market continues to operate under a monopoly regime, the ministry has not 
established a spectrum policy or guideline for the usage of the spectrum commons. As a result 
there is little competition for spectrum.
In other countries, where the market is more liberalised, such as in Uganda, spectrum availability 
represents the main limitation to market entry. As a result many of the 23 infrastructure licences 
and 30 service licences cannot operate effectively. Ineffective management of spectrum has 
therefore compromised the benefits of competition.
A similar situation can be found also in Cote d’Ivoire. Warid obtained a licence in 2007, but has not 
been able to launch services commercially as it has not obtained the necessary wireless frequencies.
On the other hand, in Botswana the regulator installed a mobile monitoring centre with the aim of 
monitoring spectrum allocation and illegal radio users.
Another concern is the hoarding of spectrum, when an operator obtains a licence and is awarded 
spectrum, but does not launch commercial operations. For instance, in South Africa the demand for 
WiMax spectrum is growing, but a large amount of spectrum has already been allocated to the 
state-owned broadcast signal distributor Sentech. Historically Sentech has been assigned this 
spectrum for broadcasting purposes, but it has been argued that in the dynamic convergence 
environment this has resulted in an under-utilisation of frequencies that could more optimally be 
used by other operators. As a result, spectrum allocation is in a stalemate. Despite the conclusion of 
public hearings and the publication of a spectrum findings paper in June 2008, there has not been 
much progress. The Department of Communications announced in 2009 its intention to conduct a 
spectrum audit, but they have anticipated that this will take two years.
In light of the challenges related to the allocation of spectrum, some regulators have opted to use 
an auction process with the aim of providing equal access to spectrum. There have been concerns 
that the bidder with more financial resources often wins the bid and therefore smaller operators are 
left out. There are however mechanisms, such as considering other non-financial factors, or not 
selecting the highest bid, but instead the second or third, to overcome this and avoid the 
overvaluing of spectrum in bidding wars and the resultant high prices for consumers. Nigeria is one 
of the countries that has been proactive in this are. In 2009, however, a number of legal and 
political issues arose over the auctioning process of the 2.3 GHz band in Nigeria. In October 2009, 
the Nigerian federal court ordered the Nigerian Communication Commission to halt the process to 
re-auction the 2.3 GHz band.
Interconnection
Call termination is a natural monopoly element of the network. While call origination can be made 
competitive in numerous ways, there is simply no alternative to terminating a call on the network 
of the operator who owns the number a caller is trying to reach. The basis of regulation of this 
monopoly service is that termination rates should be based on the costs of an efficient operator so 
that interconnecting operators, and ultimately end users, would not have to bear the costs of an 
inefficient operator. There is overwhelming international evidence that cost-based termination 
rates encourage competition and more affordable pricing.
In support of high termination rates, dominant mobile operators have argued that lowering 
termination rates will lead to increases in access and usage prices, leading to fewer people being 
able to afford communication services, and resultant lower profits that will limit operators’ 
capacity to invest. Evidence suggests the opposite has been the case. Lowering termination rates 
towards the cost of an efficient operator leads to increased competition, lower retail prices and 
higher mobile subscriber numbers (see Table 6). All of the 21 European countries in Table 4 have 
seen MTR cuts between 2006 and 2010. None has seen an increase in prices between 2006 and 
2008 (more recent data is not yet available from the OECD) and only one experienced a drop in 
mobile tele-density. Luxembourg’s mobile tele-density dropped from 152 to 146 mobile 
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competition and more 
affordable pricing.
subscribers per 100 inhabitants between 2006 and 2008. The drop could be due to a reduction in 
duplicated SIM cards, with lower off-net prices due to lower MTRs reducing the need to have two 
SIM cards. It is unlikely to be the result of increased access and usage prices considering that 
prices came down in the same period.
Table 6: Changes in mobile low-usage basket prices compared to changes in MTR
Mobile Termination 
Rates in Euro Cents
(ERG/BEREC)










2006 2008 Decrease 
in %
2006 2009 Increase  
in %
Austria 11,21 3,50 69% 193,43 148,26 23% 19,76 24,22 23%
Belgium 13,97 8,84 37% 175,51 146,92 16% 9,85 12,42 26%
Denmark 11,34 7,37 35% 68,82 50,31 27% 5,83 6,86 18%
Finland 7,90 4,90 38% 99,89 60,31 40% 5,67 7,70 36%
France 9,80 4,76 51% 239,68 216,49 10% 51,66 57,97 12%
Germany 11,39 6,77 41% 123,55 104,55 15% 85,65 105,52 23%
Greece 12,48 6,24 50% 302,47 202,46 33% 10,98 13,30 21%
Hungary 10,71 5,22 51% 230,48 217,08 6% 9,97 11,79 18%
Iceland 12,12 4,45 63% 142,61 117,61 18% 0,30 0,35 17%
Ireland 10,54 9,68 8% 202,95 149,95 26% 4,69 4,87 4%
Italy 12,20 8,24 32% 233,39 195,23 16% 80,42 90,61 13%
Luxembourg 14,00 8,98 36% 112,84 107,59 5% 0,71 0,72 1%
Netherlands 11,40 7,30 36% 119,63 105,02 12% 17,30 21,18 22%
Norway 8,85 7,05 20% 111,2 86,72 22% 4,87 5,34 10%
Poland 13,52 4,32 68% 209,79 147,94 29% 36,75 44,55 21%
Portugal 11,71 6,50 44% 178,44 153,8 14% 12,23 15,18 24%
Slovak 
Republic
10,46 7,28 30% 255,4 241,62 5% 4,89 5,50 12%
Spain 11,31 6,20 45% 258,02 250,8 3% 45,70 50,99 12%
Sweden 7,83 3,09 61% 87,92 77,69 12% 9,61 11,43 19%
Switzerland 15,15 10,70 29% 145,11 111,03 23% 7,44 9,26 24%
UK 8,70 5,52 37% 170,53 160,4 6% 70,08 80,38 15%
Average 11,27 6,52 42% 174,36 145,32 17% 494,36 580,14 17%
(Source: OECD 2007; OECD 2009; ERG 2006; ERG 2010, ITU2010)
Figures 1 and 2 display OECD termination rates for 2009 against cost of usage (OECD usage baskets) 
and minutes of use. The general trend is that countries with lower termination rates in a Calling 
Party Pays environment have lower usage cost and higher minutes of use.
African countries have embarked on regulatory interventions that reduce mobile termination rates 
towards the cost of an efficient operators. While Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia conducted cost 
studies, Namibia used a benchmarking approach. Table 5 displays the up-to-date mobile termination 
rates in currency specified in the regulation and in US cents. Figure 3 compares mobile termination 
rates in US cents graphically. Plotting these termination rates against the cost of OECD low user 
baskets for mobile telecommunication (OECD, 2006) for the cheapest product available confirms the 
link between high termination rates and high prices for the African countries covered (see Figure 4).
The termination rate reductions in Kenya and in Namibia resulted in lower retail prices. The case of 
Namibia has demonstrated how benchmarking can be used to increase fairness in competition 
among operators, and that regulatory interventions can lead to cheaper prices, more subscribers 
and more investment. It also showed how a regulatory bottleneck can be overcome relatively 
quickly and inexpensively by using alternative regulatory strategies such as benchmarking, and by 
placing the burden of contestation onto operators that have the relevant data, skills and resources 
to contest the benchmarks if they feel they are unjustified (Stork, 2010).
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Figure 1: Mobile termination rates versus cost of usage (source TMG2010)
Figure 2: Mobile termination rates versus minutes of use (source TMG2010)
The termination rate ruling by the CCK of August 2010 and the immediate slashing of retail prices 
by smaller mobile operators have shown how important cost-based termination rates are for fair 
competition. The CCK ruling has been groundbreaking in several ways. The determination is based 
on a pure LRIC cost study in line with international best practice and the recommendations of the 
European Commission to European regulators from May 2009. Kenya is the first country to apply 
the EU recommendations of 2009 by enforcing cost-based termination rate caps based on pure 
LRIC. Kenya therefore has one of the lowest mobile termination rates in Africa at 2.21 Ksh (2.7 US 
cents). Another groundbreaking aspect is the retail price cap for off-net calls of dominant operators 
by requiring them to be less than or equal to the on-net price. This prevents dominant operators 
creating club effects by setting off-net prices high. The determination is also groundbreaking 
because the CCK announced that it will monitor market developments in SMS termination, 
broadband interconnection, money transfer interconnection and infrastructure sharing, and that it 
will intervene if commercial negotiations will not lead to competitive outcomes. This creates 





































Mobile Termination Rates 2009 in US cents
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Benin 62 CFA 504,1 12,3 TMG 2010
Botswana 0,45 Pula 6,92 6,5 glide path to 0.3 Pula by 
2014
BTA 2011
Burkina Faso 50 CFA 504,1 9,9 TMG 2010
Cameroon 0,16 US$ 1 16,0 TMG 2010
Côte d’Ivoire 45 CFA 504,1 8,9 ATCI (2009)
Ghana 0,05 Cedi 1,45 3,4 NCA (YEAR)
Kenya 2,21 Kenya Shilling 82,25 2,7 CCK (2010)
Mozambique 2,59 MT 33,2 7,8 Symmetric MTR since 2010 INCM (Year)
Mauritius 0,9 Rupee 31,86 2,8 ICTA (2008)
Namibia 0,3 NAD 7,34 4,1 NCC (2009a)
Nigeria 8,2 NGA 152,80 5,4 for existing operators NCC (2009b)
Rwanda 0,07 US$ 1 7,0 TMG 2010
Senegal 11,35 CFA 504,1 2,3 TMG 2010




Tanzania 7,49 US cents 1 7,5 Further drop to 7.16 US 
cents 1 January 2012
TRCA 2007
Tunisia 0,085 Tunisian 
Dinar (TND)
1,44 5,9 TMG 2010
Uganda 181 Uganda 
Shilling
2200 8,2 Warid as a different MTR UCC (Year)
Zambia 0,059 US$ 1 5,9 further reductions to 5 US 
cents by 1 January 2012
ZICTA (2010)
Ethiopia na 14,62 na only 1 mobile operator TMG 2010
* Average interbank rate for 2010 (source www.Oanda.com)
The impact on retail prices has been dramatic. Zain, which was acquired by Bharti Airtel Limited 
(“Bharti”) in June 2010, took the lead by announcing a reduction in their prices of over 50%. Calls 
from Zain are now at Ksh3 to any network and Ksh1 for an SMS. It is not surprising that Bharti took 
the lead given its reputation in India, where it proved its dominance in the market by launching a 
price war in 2009 with its main rival Reliance Communications.
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Figure 3: Mobile termination rates in US cents (FX = average 2010)
Orange also cut its rates, remaining the cheapest prepaid operator in Kenya (See Table 6). In 
reaction to this, Safaricom started a prepaid promotion with rates between Ksh2 and Ksh5 a minute. 
The prices, which were only effective until the end of September 2010, are based on different 
recharge amounts. Figure 4 displays the cost of the cheapest prepaid product for each operator for 
low, medium and high OECD usage baskets according to the 2006 definition (OECD, 2006). The 
table only displays long-term rates, not promotions. It is clear that Safaricom’s prepaid prices have 
become unsustainable. It will need to make permanent changes to its tariff structure or surrender 
market share to its competitors, or else face a loss of subscribers and market share.
Figure 4: Monthly cost of OECD Low User bundle in Kes (2006 Definition)
The examples of Namibia and Kenya demonstrate that cost-based termination rates are a pre-
condition for fair competition and lead to lower retail prices. It can be expected that countries will 
follow the example set and that termination rates across the continent will approach the cost of 
efficient termination over the next couple of years.
The End of Roaming
For over a decade European regulators have struggled to regulate roaming tariffs. This resulted in 
a challenged European Union order in 2008 regulating roaming tariffs for European operators. 
Progressive African regulators, on the other hand, had started to speak about the need to 
regulate exorbitant roaming charges from their jurisdictions. The rapid end to roaming charges in 
East Africa challenged the conventional wisdom that the only way to reduce roaming charges 
was through complex and resource intensive regulation, monitoring and enforcement. This 
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While policy makers and regulators elsewhere in Africa emulate European “best practice” regulation, 
despite the difficulties mature and resourced regulators in the European Union face in instituting 
legally binding maximum tariffs for roaming, in East Africa operators have dropped roaming 
charges from competitive business models. The creation of an enabling policy and regulatory 
environment allowed operators to integrate historically separate national networks into cross-
border operations, undermining roaming markets in the region and ending roaming charges in 
East Africa forever. While Europe is struggling with the regulation of high roaming charges, in East 
Africa high tariffs and roaming charges were being far more effectively addressed through 
competition in marginal markets.10
With the decision in September 2006 by Celtel, now Zain, to exploit its only competitive advantage 
– licences in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – and crack open the regional market by dropping all 
roaming charges between its networks, it set in motion a competitive struggle for roaming 
customers from which there was no return. Zain – itself a marginal operator in all three original East 
African community jurisdictions prior to its disruption of the market – achieved, with regard to 
roaming, in weeks what most African regulators had not even contemplated and European 
regulators had struggled with for nearly a decade.11
Mobile phone users in this region are largely pre-paid and adept at using multiple SIM cards. There 
was little stopping them from moving en masse to a network that offered them their home 
package rates as they moved across East Africa’s porous borders. With the high price of 
communications in East Africa and the premium charges placed on international mobile roaming, 
the effect of this move was to compel other regional operators to follow suit, and further, to 
institute various other pricing strategies in an attempt to retain or recover their dominant positions. 
As a result, not only did roaming charges disappear across all networks, but the prices of various 
other mobile services also fell as subscriber numbers soared.12
Shortly after the launch of One Network in September 2006, the competing networks in the three 
East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda responded by creating their own competing 
seamless service. The service, branded Kama Kawaida (as usual), brought together partner networks 
in four countries, namely Safaricom in Kenya, MTN and UTL in Uganda, Vodacom in Tanzania and 
MTN Rwanda.13
In Kenya, for example, Zain aimed to explore ways of increasing its market share vis-à-vis Safaricom, 
the dominant market player. Exploiting its contiguous network to increase its market share was an 
opportunity that it exploited. Zain’s customer numbers grew, but not as fast as those of Safaricom, 
which had responded swiftly to counter Zain’s competitive advantage. By December 2008, Zain 
customers had increased to three million and a market share of 17%. Thus One Network helped 
retain customers in its network, especially in the face of two new players that entered the market in 
the last quarter of 2008, namely Orange and Econet Wireless.14
Mobile Banking & Transfer Systems
The difference between mobile banking and mobile payment systems is that mobile banking 
requires a bank account and a mobile payment system does not.
Mobile banking services are offered by a bank as an additional channel to do banking. They make 
use of a mobile telecommunications network as a platform to perform traditional banking, such as 
performing balance checks, transferring money between accounts and making payments. 
Mobile transfers services are provided by a number of mobile operators across the continent. The 
key advantage of the service is that it does not require a bank account neither for the sender nor for 
the receiver. The mobile transfer services are targeted at the unbanked population and only offer 
one out of many banking services, transfer of money.
Mobile transfer and payments services were pioneered by Safaricom, Kenya’s dominant mobile 
operator, in 2007. The service is popularly known as M-Pesa. Within three months of the launch 
of services, M-Pesa had 400 agents, compared to 450 bank branches and 600 ATMs through 
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the country15 . Following the success of M-Pesa, similar systems have been developed across 
the continent. In the East African region, mobile transfer services are offered by MTN, Zain, 
Vodacom Tanzania, and Rwandatel in East Africa. West African mobile operators are 
increasingly providing mobile payment systems to address the low-end-customer segment in 
the region. The majority of the population in West Africa live in rural areas and do not have 
access to banking facilities. Mobile transfer services are being deployed as part of the 
operators’ customer acquisition strategy and to facilitate growth. For example, in 2008 Orange 
in the Ivory Coast launched a service called Orange Money. It allows customers access to an 
entire range of services making it possible to carry out day-to-day banking operations and 
transactions such as depositing and withdrawing money from the Orange Money account up 
to an amount of CFAF 100,000 (approximately €150 ), the transfer of money from one person to 
another, and the purchase of airtime credit up to CFAF 10,000, 24 hours a day. In addition to 
this, customers are able to pay their utility bills through their mobile phones.
In many regards, the telecommunication and financial sectors are similar. Both are crucial for 
economic and social development, and both have only a few players (oligopolies) and need 
hence to be regulated in the public interest. In the future, not only will banks and mobile 
operators be required to co-operate more closely, but the different sector regulators will have to 
do that as well.
Mobile payment systems could be operator or bank specific, or they could be completely 
independent, operating on servers that communicate with banks, individuals and companies 
across operator networks. Financial service provision requires a banking licence. Operators may 
apply for a banking licence or co-operate with a bank. Banks could also become virtual network 
operators, mobile operators without their own infrastructure that roam on the networks of other 
operators. From an economic or developmental perspective, the ideal would be a mobile payment 
system that is independent of banks and operators and allows transfers and interactions between 
any bank and any operator. The formal financial system, with its automatic clearing bureau, is such a 
system, but it tends to be very expensive. An alternative would be a system similar to the peering 
system used for Internet traffic, where operations carry traffic for each other without charge. An 
operator should have no objection to receiving money from another operator, which is different 
from terminating a call for another operator. A mobile payment system would need to replicate this 
formal system but with a zero or extremely low transaction cost for the actual users. The current 
value being generated by both mobile operators and banks in Africa makes a partnership for such a 
system between banks and operators unlikely. A third party, who is able to understand the 
dynamics of a volume-based, small margin business, is more likely to succeed.
Just as convergence forced the integration of broadcasting and telecommunications, so mobile 
banking is forcing the convergence of the financial and telecommunications sectors. Unfortunately, 
the convergence of two such heavily regulated industries means that this potential is unlikely to be 
met unless policy-makers lay the ground rules for innovation. Recommendations could include 
encouraging the development of industry standards for mobile banking security based upon open 
access principles and changing regulatory systems to allow mobile operators to become banks, or 
banks to operate Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs).
Policy-makers need to make some strategic decisions about how best to leverage the opportunity 
that mobile banking represents. In order to allow innovation, regulators, on the other hand, quickly 
have to learn to grapple responsively and flexibly with new issues that appear to extend beyond 
their domains of expertise. From the solutions that emerge, the market can help decide what is 
most appropriate given the African context.
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15 African Economic Outlook (2009). MPesa leads mobile payments in Kenya.Available online: http://
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/innovation-and-ict-in-africa-2009/pro-development-innovative-
applications/box-22-m-pesa-leads-mobile-payments-in-kenya/. (Accessed September 2010).
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Policy outcomes are captured in this section through their impact on access to ICTs and cost of 
usage. The section will proceed by analysing the policy outcomes in the fixed, mobile and 
Internet segments. A pricing analysis of the total cost of ownership in the mobile segment and 
prepaid mobile pricing is provided. The section ends with an assessment of leased line pricing in 
selected countries.
Fixed-line
In most African countries fixed-line services have been very limited, unreliable and of poor 
quality. Consequently, Africa has the lowest fixed-line penetration rates in the world. The rapid 
increase in mobile subscribers is due to the ability of mobile operators to meet the pent up 
demand for communications.
South Africa is the biggest market in 
terms of the number of fixed-line 
subscribers of the countries reviewed. This 
is followed by Nigeria, which has three 
times the population of South Africa, but 
which saw some fixed-line growth, while 
South Africa’s fixed-line market has been 
stagnant. However, nominal figures do 
not accurately capture the level of access 
to fixed-line services within a respective 
country. Table 6 depicts the number of 
fixed lines as a percentage of the 
population. Tunisia , South Afr ica, 
Botswana and Namibia have the highest 
fixed-line teledensity. This can be 
attributed at least partially to higher GDP 
per capita levels. In addition to this, the 
markets have had strong fixed-line 
i n c u m b e n t o p e r a to r s w i t h we l l -
established bases that have enjoyed a 
monopoly over the fixed-line segments. 
Despite the introduction of competition in 
South Africa, fixed-line penetration remains 
low. This is partly due to regulatory 
bottlenecks that delayed the launch of the 
second national operator and the 
substitution effect of mobile services. 
The teledensities of below 3% of the other countries under review are the result of many factors. 
Among them the failure or inability to privatise incumbents, who are generally as a result unable to 
capitalise on the modernisation of their networks for mobile competition. Many of these markets 
have also not been liberalised, which means that if the incumbent is privatised the country is 
simply left with a private monopoly, more efficiently able to extract profits but without the public 
interest mandate of public monopolies.
It is evident from Table 6 that in 2008 there was a decline in the number of fixed-line subscribers as 
a percentage of the population in all of the countries with the exception of Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Kenya. In 2009, there was an increasing trend in the number of fixed-
line subscribers as a percentage of the population across all the countries with the exception of 
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Namibia and South Africa.
The rise in the number of fixed-line subscribers can be attributed to the increase in competition 
following the introduction of service neutral licences. In addition, fixed-wireless operators emerged 
as significant challengers in both the fixed and mobile market segments. The low penetration in the 
fixed-line market created opportunities for the CDMA operators to provide wireless local loop 
services. In Ghana, for instance, the introduction of CDMA technology had a significant impact in 
reviving the fixed-line market segment. Kasapa, the sole CDMA operator, is aggressively marketing 
its fixed wireless service dubbed “Kasapa Home-Work”.
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Between 2006 and 2008, South Africa and Tunisia maintained their leadership positions in terms of 
the number of mobile SIM cards as a percentage of the population, though in 2008, Nigeria 
officially passed South Africa to become the country with the greatest number of mobile 
subscribers in absolute terms. In 2009 Botswana passed both South Africa and Tunisia to become 
the country with the greatest mobile penetration, according to the ITU.16  In addition, there has 
been tremendous growth in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. Even countries like Burkina Faso and 
Rwanda, at the bottom of the index, have experienced significant growth levels, with the number 
of subscribers tripling or even quadrupling between 2006 and 2009.
Table 9 below compares the number 
of subscribers as a percentage of the 
population in each country between 
2006 and 2009, which is often 
erroneously reflected as the number 
of individual subscribers or portion 
of the population with mobile 
phones. The penetration rate refers 
not to how many people own 
mobile phones (subscribers) but to 
the number of SIM cards sold. 
M o re ove r, m o s t m a r k e t s a re 
characterised by multi-SIM usage, 
which suggests that the penetration 
rates are lower than stated in official 
statistics. Despite over-counting, it is 
evident that there has been rapid 
growth in the adoption of mobile 
services and there are significant 
differences between 2006 and 2009. 
However, in light of the use of 
multiple SIM cards, the number of 
new subscribers is lower than is 
stated with an over-count generally 
of between 5% and 15% (see 
Gillwald and Stork, 2008).
Competition is prevalent in most markets and customers are highly price sensitive. As a result, 
customers obtain multiple SIMs in order to enjoy the competitive rates and promotions on different 
network. In some countries, like Benin, off-net interconnection costs are high and therefore 
customers prefer to make on-net calls and use multi-SIMs to communicate.
The growth in the mobile market can be attributed to the increase in the number of mobile 
operators, investments in mobile networks in terms of coverage, the availability of differentiated 
products which have increased customer choice, access to low cost handsets, the availability of 
competitive tariffs and in some markets the introduction of low denomination vouchers, which 
have made mobile services more accessible to the poor.
Internet
Development of the Internet market in Africa is in its nascent stage. Table 8 below depicts Internet 
users and broadband subscribers as a percentage of the population. In 2009, Tunisia had the highest 
number of Internet users as a percentage of the population, at 34.07 %. Like South Africa, the rapid 
uptake of Internet in Tunisia is based on its higher GDP per capita levels, though it managed to 
increase this far more significantly than South Africa, which only stands at 8.82% according to the ITU. 
Nigeria comes in second with 28.43%, then Kenya with 10.04%, Uganda with 9.78 %, South Africa with 
8.82 %, and Senegal with 7.36%. The remainder of the markets have a penetration rate of less than 7%, 
which explains the gap between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Low bandwidth and high prices 
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16 The 2007-2008 RIA Household and Individual User survey for example found that the percentage of the 
population 16 years and older with duplicated SIM cards ranged from 4.5% in Zambia to as high as 36.2 % in the 
case of Benin.
Table 9: Mobile SIM cards as a percentage of the population




















44,10 60,86 77,34 96,12
73,60 77,89 84,59 94,96
81,54 86,02 90,60 92,67
23,30 33,25 49,55 63,38
20,70 37,11 50,74 63,33
13,00 24,45 41,85 56,33
29,73 38,31 49,39 56,05
25,75 30,53 44,13 55,06
19,96 30,06 42,06 48,65
22,40 27,35 41,66 47,24
14,37 20,16 30,62 39,94
17,20 24,31 32,28 37,89
13,84 21,43 28,04 34,07
6,77 13,69 27,02 28,69
11,00 14,08 19,68 26,08
3,41 6,72 13,61 24,30
7,10 10,94 16,76 20,94
1,10 1,54 2,42 4,89
have been major challenges in the development, penetration and use of Internet services across sub-
Saharan Africa. Many countries rely on satellite communication for bandwidth, due to the limited 
reach of the traditional fixed-line networks and lack of access to undersea cables. With the high cost of 
satellite connectivity price, access prices are invariably high. The landing of a number of undersea 
cables, like SEACOM and EASSy, have lowered the cost of accessing Internet services and is expected 
to drive demand for Internet services. Further cables, including the West African Cable System (WACS), 
are expected to land in 2011.
Figure 5 – Households with a working computer and Internet
(Source: RIA 2007/8)
Where cables have landed, such as 
Kenya and South Africa, wholesale 
prices tend not to have been passed 
on to consumers in terms of price 
reductions or subscriptions. Instead, 
subscribers have been provided 
with more bandwidth for the price 
they are currently paying. While this 
is welcomed by a highly frustrated, 
low-capped group of current, 
largely elite users, from a policy 
point of view it is unlikely to drive 
greater take up of broadband 
services, which are extraordinarily 
costly by international standards.
The true potential of the undersea 
cable projects will only be realised 
w h e n t h e r e i s a t e r r e s t r i a l 
infrastructure in place and this 
depends on the ability of the 
governments and operators to 
deploy fibre cables in the respective 
markets. An effort in this regard is 
the roll out of the Central African 
Backbone, a project financed by the 
World Bank for the CEMAC region. 
However, unless national regulations are updated to ensure an open access model to this new 
infrastructure, it will not bring about the intended results in terms of increased access and quality 
and reduced prices of bandwidth.
In addition, there is a need for governments to create enabling regulatory environments in order to 
attract investment. In the absence of or delays to the roll out of national backbones for broadband 
services in most African countries, mobile operators are playing a lead role in infrastructure 
backbone developments. In some cases the state has taken the lead in developing national 
backbone infrastructure. For example, the Nigerian Government has set up a company called the 
TUNISIA – BROADBAND DEVELOPMENT
Competition has largely occurred at the service level, with five Internet services providers in the market, 
namely Tunet, Topnet, GlobalNet (GNet), Hexabyte and Planet, rather than network competition where 
incumbent, Tunisie Telecom (TT) has a monopoly on the wholesale broadband market. 
As a result, all the other ISPs in Tunisia resale TT’s ADSL. In 2008, intense competition between the top 
three players, Tunet, Topnet and GNet, resulted in price wars and significant reductions in the cost of 
accessing broadband services. There are two main elements of ADSL subscription in Tunisia: 
subscription fees payable to the service provider (ISP) and others payable to Tunisie Telecom (TT).
In 2008, the Tunisian regulator introduced a policy that subscribers should be allowed to double their 
current access speeds at the same cost (ISP component) annually. For example, in 2007, when TT 
announced the availability of 1Mbps services, subscribers on 512kbps speeds could upgrade to 1Mbps 
speeds and continue paying their 512kbps subscription fees. Subscribers on 256kbps packages could 
migrate to 512kbps and pay their old subscription. This policy is intended to facilitate seamless 
migration by Tunisian Internet users to higher access speeds, with greater usage.
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Backbone Connectivity Network (BCN) to be a neutral wholesale telecommunications provider. The 
company has laid out fibre throughout Nigeria. Other countries have adopted Build, Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) strategies. For example the Kenyan government contracted three companies to 
construct a National Terrestrial Fibre Optic National Network (FONN), also known as the National 
Fibre Optic Backbone Infrastructure, which is aimed at providing terrestrial links to major towns and 
commercial hubs. Over 5000km of fibre was laid across the country at a cost of $130 million. The 
government plans to expand the backbone infrastructure to the borders of neighbouring countries 
like Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia. Uganda and Rwanda have embarked on similar backbone 
infrastructure projects. These countries have contracted third parties to build the infrastructure and 
ownership with be transferred to the governments upon completion of the projects.



















Total per 100 
population
Total 
Tunisia 4,03 34, 07 3,63 372 818
South Africa Not available 8, 82 0,96 481 000 10,52 5 271 825
Botswana Not available 6, 15 0,77 15 000 2,97 58 000
Senegal 0,47 7, 36 0,47 58 720
Ghana 0,38 5, 44 0,11 27 399 0,24 58 007
Rwanda 1,47 4, 50 0,08 8 388 0,15 15 177
Zambia Not available 6, 31 0,06 8 000 0,03 4 314
Mozambique 0,059 2, 68 0,05 12 502 0,40 92 468
Nigeria 0,58 28, 43 0,05 81 958 4,89 7 565 435
Cote d'Ivoire Not available 4, 59 0,05 10 000
Burkina Faso Not available 1, 13 0,04 6 000
Kenya 2,11 10, 04 0,02 8 349 4,98 1 981 048
Benin 0,21 2, 24 0,02 1 791
Namibia Not available 5, 87 0,02 430* 1,48 32 211
Uganda 0,91 9, 78 0,02 6 000 1,10 360 000
Tanzania Not available 1, 55 0.02* 6,439** 1,37 601 324
Cameroon 0,13 3, 84 0,00 900 0,49 96 600
Ethiopia 0,58 0, 54 0,00 3 498 0,10 84 773
* Telecom Namibia had 6000 ADSL subscribers in November 2009
* * Tanzania ITU data for 2008
(Source ITU)
Figure 5 is based on a household survey conducted by RIA between 2007 and 2008. It is evident that 
personal computer ownership is extremely limited, and that the majority of households have very 
little or no Internet connection, which indicates that there is a need for demand-supply stimulation 
required for nations to become connected. A major hurdle is the cost of personal computers and 
Internet enabled devices. Broadband access across sub-Saharan Africa is in its infancy. In 2008, most 
countries surveyed had fixed broadband penetration rates of less than 2%. Although mobile operators 
have introduced mobile broadband services including 3G and 3.5G, use of these services remains 
limited. The majority of customers use basic-feature mobile phones and the cost of accessing Internet 
enabled mobile devices is prohibitive. Evidence of the availability of broadband services is found in 
Tunisia and South Africa where ADSL has been overtaken by mobile broadband. South Africa was one 
of the earliest countries to introduce broadband, but Tunisia has greater penetration. This is due to 
higher levels of connectivity and backbone infrastructure development within the North African 
region as a result of state investment.
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Policy Outcome: Pricing
Price is the ultimate indicator for competition. Monitoring prices and hence cost to end-user 
remains a key regulatory function to measure competitive pressure and monitor affects of 
regulatory interventions to establish or maintain fair competition among existing operators. Mobile 
penetration rates and mobile retail prices in a country depend on many factors, such as number of 
fixed and mobile operators, sequence of market entry, technologies deployed, market share of 
operators, user profiles of subscribers, disposable income, business models used by operators, 
penetration of substitute technologies like fixed-line and cable TV, past regulatory interventions 
and sequence of it, regulatory strategies, communication laws and policies and many other social 
and economic factors. Monitoring pricing strategies of mobile operators is useful for several 
regulatory functions and important in measuring policy and regulatory outcomes.
Cost of Mobile Ownership
In a global pricing study Nokia has calculated the monthly total-cost-of-ownership for mobile 
phones for a series of countries.17  18  Generally, Asian-Pacific countries tend to be lower than the 
global average. For example total cost of mobile services in Bangladesh and India are around the 
$10 mark. Latin American countries however tend to have highest costs with countries Brazil and 
Peru coming in above the $100 dollar mark.
African countries tend to be concentrated in the middle range with the ten most expensive 
countries above the average of $44 across the countries covered by this study. Topping the list 
are Morocco, Cameroon, Angola, Swaziland, Cote d’Ivoire and South Africa. These countries 
compare with the top end of the Latin America countries, but are nowhere near as high as 
countries like Brazil. The island states of Madagascar and Mauritius, which rank fourth and 
eleventh respectively, perform more in line with Asia, where the lowest prices seem 
concentrated. They are followed by Ghana and Sudan, who come in well below the global 
average at $20. Ethiopia also has a very low TCO, mobile services prices, are not cost-based but 
set by the government owned monopoly. The negative outcome of this is the low return on 
investment in Ethiopia, which has inhibited the extension of the network, which primarily serves 
an urban elite.
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Figure 6 – Total Cost of Ownership in Africa (US$) adapted from Nokia (2007)
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17 Nokia Siemens Networks (2009). How affordable is mobile data? Available online:
http://unite.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/adwords/article/view/id/180. (Accessed June 2010)




While these nominal figures are a good indicator of the differential costs of communication on the 
continent, adjusting these figures for purchasing power poverty (PPP), as has been done to the 
pricing baskets used for this policy paper, demonstrates the real cost of services within the context of 
each economy and the affordability for users. When Uganda’s prices are adjusted for PPP for example, 
mobile services in that country become amongst the most expensive. This will be followed by an 
example of how the baskets can be used for regulatory supervision. This will then be demonstrated 
using the case of Namibia where OECD basket methodologies were used over a period of five years to 
monitor sector developments and measure the impact of regulatory interventions.
The generally high cost of services is reflected in Figure 6 below. This depicts the monthly total-
cost-of-ownership of mobile data. Generally, Asian countries tend to be lower than the global 
average. For example, the total cost of mobile services in Bangladesh and India is around the $10 
mark. Latin American countries, however tend to have costs above the average mark, with 
countries like Brazil and Peru coming in above the $100 dollar mark.
Prepaid Mobile Pricing
The OECD basket methodology used below is based on the 2006 definitions (OECD 2006). The 
OECD released new basket definitions in April 2010 (OECD 2010). One key difference between the 
2006 and the 2010 mobile basket definition is the range of operators to include. The 2006 definition 
included dominant operators that together have 50% market share. The 2010 definition includes 
the two largest operators. Those countries with just two licensed operators would automatically 
include all operators.
Generally, the basket methodology has strength and weaknesses. Strengths include the ability to 
compare products of an operator, comparing cheapest products of operators, and comparing 
cheapest products available in a county. This allows benchmarking of countries, operators and 
products. The basket methodology, applied consistently, allows consumers to compare products 
within and between operators. The weaknesses are that:
• The OECD methodology of 2006 only includes dominant operators, the 2010 baskets only 
the two largest operators. Price changes following regulatory interventions would mainly 
be expected from small operators that attempt to gain market share through lower prices. 
On the other hand, dominant operators reflect what people really pay better than 
comparing the cheapest product available in a country.
• OECD baskets do not take into account the number of people on each package and actual 
minutes of use for each package. No one is an average user and actual consumption 
patterns of an individual might only poorly be reflected, but it does allow for comparison.
• The same basket is used for all operators, while subscribers of smaller operators are likely to 
have a different off-net/on-net ratio compared to larger operators.
Compensating for some of these weaknesses, this paper applies the basket methodology of the 


































Figure 7: Share of mobile subscribers that were prepaid users in 2007/8 (RIA household survey)
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The basket methodology can also be applied to post-paid products. This would increase the 
complexity of the data analysed tremendously but could be the subject of further studies. This 
paper only uses prepaid products, given that the vast majority of Africans mobile phone users use 
prepaid (see Figure 7).
The RIA database comprises 184 mobile prepaid products from 112 operators from 26 countries. The 
OECD mobile pricing basket methodology of 2006 was implemented with minor adaptations. MMSs 
were, for example, not included because it has not widely used outside of the major markets. Friends 
and family offers or preferred number plans, which offer unlimited calls to certain numbers on the 
same network, were not taken into account as they make the process too complex. Promotions for 
particular days or for certain recharge denominations were also not taken into account.
Table 11: Cheapest prepaid product in a country compared with cheapest prepaid product from 
dominant operators for OECD usage baskets (2006 definition) for 18 RIA countries
Cheapest Prepaid 




















Low User Medium 
User
High User
% USD % USD % USD
Botswana 5,04 10,28 20,67 5,04 10,28 20,67 0% 0,00 0% 0,00 0% 0,00
Ethiopia* 3,74 7,59 14,98 3,74 7,59 14,98 0% 0,00 0% 0,00 0% 0,00
Mozambique 7,45 15,07 29,88 7,45 15,07 29,88 0% 0,00 0% 0,00 0% 0,00
Senegal 6,12 12,31 24,25 6,12 12,31 24,25 0% 0,00 0% 0,00 0% 0,00
South Africa 7,64 15,38 29,63 7,64 16,12 33,13 0% 0,00 5% 0,74 11% 3,50
Tunisia 5,06 10,24 20,19 5,06 10,24 20,19 0% 0,00 0% 0,00 0% 0,00
Zambia 6,57 13,28 25,99 6,60 13,54 26,37 0% 0,03 2% 0,26 1% 0,38
Cameroon 8,59 16,42 30,45 9,30 17,91 33,22 8% 0,71 8% 1,49 8% 2,77
Uganda 6,33 12,90 24,05 6,95 13,90 26,85 9% 0,62 7% 1,00 10% 2,80
Burkina Faso 11,04 22,65 45,19 12,54 25,98 52,52 12% 1,50 13% 3,33 14% 7,33
Côte d’Ivoire 7,00 14,34 28,88 8,15 16,34 31,59 14% 1,15 12% 2,00 9% 2,71
Ghana 2,29 4,36 8,01 3,04 6,10 12,16 25% 0,75 29% 1,74 34% 4,15
Benin 4,92 11,05 24,75 7,50 14,74 27,84 34% 2,58 25% 3,69 11% 3,09
Kenya 3,35 6,37 11,42 5,93 11,82 22,78 44% 2,58 46% 5,45 50% 11,36
Namibia 5,06 10,74 22,19 8,96 18,27 36,19 44% 3,90 41% 7,53 39% 14,00
Rwanda 3,74 7,94 16,59 6,87 13,63 26,45 46% 3,13 42% 5,69 37% 9,86
Nigeria 3,63 7,58 15,48 7,76 15,85 32,13 53% 4,13 52% 8,27 52% 16,65
Tanzania 2,93 6,06 12,24 7,26 15,24 31,84 60% 4,33 60% 9,18 62% 19,60
* Ethiopia only has one operator
(Source: www.researchictafrica-data.net)
Tables 11 and 12 compare the cheapest prepaid products available from incumbent operators 
according to the 2006 definition, to the cheapest prepaid product available in a country. The 
difference between these methodologies represents the pressure of competition within these 
countries, and indicates who offers the cheapest mobile prepaid offers.
Other characteristics have been included in Table 12, such as the number of operators and years 
since the last market entry, to demonstrate that there are no linear relationships between 
individual characteristics.
A difference between the cheapest product in a country and the cheapest product from dominant 
operators may measure the competitive pressure but it may also have little explanatory power. In 
Botswana, for example, the dominant operator Mascom is also the cheapest operator. It is likely that 
Mascom became the dominant operator because of its price leadership. The fact that the fixed line 
incumbent was not granted a licence initially may have provided the two first entrant s with an 
opportunity to compete within the market. Orange and Mascom were the first mobile licences 
issued and were licensed at the same time. Price developments and competitive pressure are 
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functions of many factors. Applying the basket methodology to all operators and analysing the 
differences between cheapest and dominant operator adds one more perspective and provides 
regulators with one more tool to monitor the level of competition in the sector.
The competitive pressures on pricing are becoming evident in certain markets. Towards the end of 
2010 Ghana had the lowest pricing for the low usage basket of the countries surveyed. This has 
been driven by the fierce competition between five mobile operators. Similar trends are found in 
the medium and high user baskets.
Ethiopia’s prices are low but these are politically determined and not necessarily cost-based. Low 
prices in Botswana and Kenya may well be the result of a pass through from regulated reductions in 
the call termination rate, as may Tanzania’s, though they are little higher and extremely high when 
adjusted for purchasing power parity.
Table 12: Cheapest prepaid product in a country compared with cheapest prepaid product from 
dominant operators for OECD usage baskets (2006 definition) for 18 RIA countries


















(ITU ICT eye 
for 2008)Low Medium High
% % %
Botswana 0% 0% 0% 3 2 Mascom Mascom 77.34
Ethiopia* 0% 0% 0% 1 11 ETC ETC 2.42
Mozambique 0% 0% 0% 2 7 mCel mCel 19.68
Senegal 0% 0% 0% 3 1 Orange Orange 44.13
South Africa 0% 5% 11% 3 8 MTN MTN & 
Vodacom
90.60
Tunisia 0% 0% 0% 2 8 Tunisiana Tunisiana 84.59
Zambia 0% 2% 1% 3 7 MTN Zain 28.04
Cameroon 8% 8% 8% 2 10 Orange MTN 32.28
Uganda 9% 7% 10% 4 2 Uganda 
Telecom
MTN 27.02
Burkina Faso 12% 13% 14% 3 9 Telcel Zain 16.76
Cote d’Ivoire 14% 12% 9% 4 3 Moov Orange & 
MTN
50.74
Ghana 25% 29% 34% 5 3 Tigo MTN 49.55
Benin 34% 25% 11% 5 3 Libercom MTN & Moov 41.85
Kenya 44% 46% 50% 3 2 Orange Safaricom 42.06
Namibia 44% 41% 39% 3 1* Telecom 
Namibia
MTC 49.39
Rwanda 46% 42% 37% 3 1 Rwandatel MTN 13.61
Nigeria 53% 52% 52% 7 4 Starcomms GloMobile & 
MTN
41.66
Tanzania 60% 60% 62% 9 5 Benson Vodacom 30.62
* Telecom Namibia’s Switch was restricted to fixed-wireless service until May 2009. Since then it has been offered as a 
mobile service.
(Source: www.researchictafrica-data.net)
Despite there being only three operators in Zambia, with a strong dominant player in Zain, who is not 
tied to the fixed-line incumbent, prices have dropped. Tunisia also has amongst the lowest prices, 
despite having a duopoly in mobile communications. Duopolies generally lead to price matching, and 
this is likely to be the explanation for the very high prices in Cameroon and countries with de facto 
duopolies such as South Africa with two strong incumbents in the mobile market and little 
competition. The only country more expensive is Burkina Faso. Other than Senegal, prices in 
Francophone countries are amongst the highest. Adjusted for purchasing power parity Burkina Faso 
remains the highest, followed by two other poor countries, Tanzania and Uganda – despite their 
relatively good performance before the adjustment. The excellent regulatory efforts in Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania to reduce prices are undermined, however, by the special taxes on communications 
equipment and services. For instance, telecom equipment in Tanzania is subject to 20% import duty 
and 20% VAT, and there is 7% special tax on mobile airtime. Even higher taxes apply in Uganda, an 
effective 30% duty on cell phones and services, which raises the costs of accessing mobile services.
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Figure 8: OECD Mobile Low Usage Basket USD and PPP
(Source: www.researchictafrica-data.net)
Internet Expenditure
Figure 9 depicts the results of the RIA demand-side survey conducted in 2007/2008. The likely 
explanation for the different average individual spend per week of Internet users in different 
countries is complex, but includes the different costs of services, where they are being accessed, 
the GDP per capita of countries, and the discretionary income available for Internet usage. 
Namibia’s Internet penetration is low for a lower middle-income country. It reflects use largely by a 
small elite likely to be able to afford relatively expensive services. Countries like Senegal, Nigeria, 
Cameroon and Kenya have lower GDP per capita but Internet penetration.
Figure 9: Average Internet expenditure per week in US









































































































Telecommunication Regulatory Environment (TRE)
The TRE19  assessment is a diagnostic instrument for assessing the performance of policy and laws 
affecting the telecom sector, and the various government entities responsible for implementation. 
The desired objective of telecom policy reform and regulation is improved sector performance, 
measured by connectivity, price, quality of service and choice. The survey asks stakeholders to assess 
the telecom regulatory environment across seven dimensions (market entry, allocation of scarce 
resources, interconnection, regulation of anti-competitive practices, universal service, tariff regulation 
and quality of service) for the fixed, mobile and VANS/ISP sectors. Of these, the first five dimensions are 
based on the Reference Paper of the Fourth Protocol of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
and reflect the broadest international consensus of the most important aspects of telecom 
regulation.20  A dimension for tariff regulation and quality of services was added after pilot studies 
found these measures necessary for any assessment of regulatory effectiveness. The Reference Paper 
also refers to the independence of the regulator, but this was left out of the dimensions selected 
because it is seen as a process variable different from the other outcome variables.
Using the Likert Scale, each of the seven dimensions is scored on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is highly 
ineffective and 5 is highly effective. The Likert Scale is a well-known psychometric response scale 
often used in questionnaires. The findings are converted into a positive and negative scale for each 
of the elements of the survey, and combined for an overall score for each country.
The TRE can also be used to assess regulatory risk in a country, particularly by those considering 
investment opportunities in the telecom sectors of more than one country, with the TRE ranking of 
the countries indicating regulatory risk. Regulatory risk refers to risks emanating from government 
action, including but not limited to the actions of the actual sector-specific regulatory agency with 
authority over the industry in question.
Investment is necessary for improving sector performance and investment risk is the primary 
determinant in making investment decisions – the higher the risk, the higher the potential rate of 
return. At the point of investment, investors consider risks associated with three environments.
The macro-level or country risk comprises factors that may affect the entire economy, such as 
inflation and foreign exchange fluctuations, as well as overall political stability. Market or 
commercial risk is comprised of factors such as demand, effect of substitutable products and 
services, and performance of competitors. Risk is partially a matter of objective analysis. An investor 
can calculate an expected rate of return on a new investment based on factors within his control 
and assumptions based on factors outside his control. However, risk is, to a great extent, also a 
matter of perception. Macro-level and regulatory risks are both difficult to measure objectively, but 
at a minimum, a subjective measure of both is necessary when making an investment.
The scope presented in this toolkit is the regulatory environment within which telecom 
operators and potential new entrants function; that is, a subset of the overall regulatory risk 
environment here described as the telecom regulatory environment, and which includes only 
telecom-specific aspects.
The TRE methodology presented here is a measure of perception that is affected by a number of 
different factors. Responses can be coloured by the political and cultural ethos with in a country, 
traditions or practices of respect or acquiescence that do not allow for the open critique of state 
processes or institutions that other countries may tolerate or encourage, despite the guarantees of 
anonymity built into the survey.21  The verification process of the survey seeks to establish the basis of 
the collective perception of the different elements of regulatory effectiveness in terms of actual 
events and regulatory developments on the ground. In the case where sector performance indicators 
show performance that can be considered satisfactory but TRE scores are low, it may be possible that 
the problem is the communication of the regulatory actions. If the latter conclusion were reached, the 
appropriate action would be to improve the way the regulatory authority communicates its actions.
Comparative Sector Performance Review 2009/2010
25
19 The original TRE instrument was designed to assess regulatory effects on investment (see Samarajiva & 
Dokeniya 2005). The TRE survey was devised by RIA’s sister network LIRNEasia (www.lirneasia.net) and has 
subsequently been developed and adjusted for surveys in Latin America and Africa. This survey builds on the 
2006 RIA TRE survey, the results of which can be found in Esselaar, Gillwald &Stork (2007)
20 http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm
21 For instance, in the Zambian case, the perception seems to be influenced by a highly publicised court case 
against the Minister of Communications over alleged corrupt practices in the privatisation of Zamtel. 
Furthermore, the subsequent lack of transparency in the sale of Zamtel (75%) to Lap Green of Libya (another 





investment risk is the 
primary determinant 
in making investment 
decisions.
The different stakeholders that are involved in the TRE have been grouped into three categories 
according to their common interests.
• Category 1: Stakeholders directly affected by telecom sector regulation. E.g. operators, 
industry associations, equipment suppliers, investors
• Category 2: Stakeholders who analyse the sector with broader interest. E.g. financial 
institutions, equity research analysts, credit rating agencies, telecom consultants, law firms
• Category 3: Stakeholders with an interest in improving the sector to help the public. E.g. 
academics, research organisations, journalists, telecom user groups, civil society, former 
members of regulatory and other government agencies, donors, current government 
employees from organisations related to the telecom sector excluding those in the telecom 
regulatory & policy hierarchy (i.e. excludes anyone from the regulatory agency, policy 
making body (often Ministry of Post and Telecom or similar), the Minister in charge of 
Telecommunications etc.).
Ideally each category should make the same contribution to the final result. In order to achieve this 
balanced representation, over-represented categories are given a weight of less than one and 
under-represented categories are given a weight of greater than one, in such a way that all three 
categories contribute equally to the final score.
Figure 10. : Overall TRE 2009 Score (-2 = very inefficient, +2=very efficient)
Market Entry
Market entry is the policy key to creating opportunities for investment, and the effectiveness 
with which it is implemented is a primary factor for assessing regulatory risk. The ability of the 
regulator to issue licences in a timely and fair manner will determine to what degree the 
potential of competitive markets are unlocked. As can be seen from the countries represented in 
the telecommunication regulatory environment survey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Tunisia and 
Mozambique scored positively in terms of market entry.
Tanzania is considered to be efficient with regards to market entry due to a number of factors. The 
country has implemented a non-restrictive regulatory environment, which has introduced 
competition into the telecommunications sector. Liberalisation of the telecommunications market 
is in line with the government’s broader objective to liberalise the economy through restructuring 
and engagement of the private sector. The country introduced a converged licensing framework in 
2005, which is both technology and service neutral, which has further stimulated industry growth. 
There are numerous operators licensed under four categories. Notably, 15 licensed network facilities 
providers, 13 network services operators, 67 application services licensees and 72 content services 
providers (45 for radio and 27 for television). Although the local loop is not unbundled, operators in 
Tanzania are offered incentives for network deployment and network-based competition such as 
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incentives are provided for cost sharing in the backbone network deployment and use. The 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act (EPOCA) of 2010 is currently underway in Parliament o 
address these issues. Despite this positive view of Tanzanian regulatory environment with regard to 
market entry, this is not reflected in its access figures. Tanzania has the lowest number of fixed lines 
as a percentage of the populations and is lagging behind in terms of mobile access.
Policy on market entry and the regulation of it is perceived positively in Uganda. The country was 
one of the first to liberalise the telecommunications market, and implemented a converged licence 
regime in 2005. The new regime makes provision for technology and service neutrality. The large 
number of players in different market segments is evidence of a open market environment: there 
are four fixed-line operators, six mobile operators and twelve Internet service providers. This in turn 
has stimulated market growth. However, Uganda’s positive regulatory perception does not 
correlate with its market performance – either in terms of access or pricing. In 2008, the country 
had a very low number of fixed lines as a percentage of the population, just ahead of Tanzania, and 
the lowest number of mobile SIM cards as a percentage of the population in 2008. This is partially 
due to the low per capita income in this very poor nation, and the artificially high cost of services as 
a result of a retrogressive tax on mobile communications.
Market entry in Botswana is perceived positively by stakeholders. In 2007, the telecommunications 
market was further liberalised through the introduction of service neutral licences, which spurred 
competition. In 2008, B-mobile, a subsidiary of Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, the 
fixed-line incumbent, entered the market. In addition to this, the new licence regime enabled the 
private telecommunications operators, Mascom Wireless and Orange Botswana, to offer both fixed 
and mobile telecommunications services. Also, a number of data and Internet service provider 
licences were converted to value-added network services licences, creating opportunities to 
provide voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) services and wireless broadband.
Botswana’s positive perception about market entry correlates with positive performance in terms of 
access and pricing. The country has a high number of mobile and fixed-line access figures behind 
South Africa, but fixed-line services are experiencing negative growth. With regards to pricing, 
mobile calls are relatively low priced in comparison to other countries.
In Ghana, market entry regulation is also perceived positively. In 2008, the market was further 
liberalised by the licensing of a sixth mobile telephony operator, Globacom, despite a relatively small 
population of 23,.35 million and GDP per capita of only US $713 in 2008. The number of operators in 
Ghana is evidence of the implementation of an open-market policy. The market currently has six 
mobile operators and two national fixed-line operators. Additionally, the Ghanaian Government has 
reduced its direct involvement in the market. In 2007, it sold 75% interest in Westel, the second 
national operator, to Zain (formerly known as Celtel). In addition to this, in 2008 the government sold 
its majority (70%) stake in Ghana Telecom to Vodafone for US $900 million. Furthermore, the 
international gateway has been liberalised and four companies, namely Vodafone Ghana, Millicom 
(TiGO) Ghana, MTN Ghana and Zain have been granted international gateway licences. Interestingly, 
Ghana has performed well in mobile access and pricing, despite the negative perception about 
market entry within the mobile segment. This perception is in contrast to the fact that, in 2009, Ghana 
had the lowest mobile pricing out of all the countries surveyed, and has experienced high growth 
levels in the number of mobile SIM cards as a percentage of the population. However, the country is 
lagging behind in terms of fixed lines as a percentage of the population.
The positive perception of the regulatory environment in Tunisia seems to reflect the positive 
response to the licensing of further mobile private mobile operators. In 2002 the market entry of 
the second operator boosted the telecom sector, which created a generally positive attitude to 
reform. The third mobile licence awarded to a consortium composed of France Telecom and 
Divona/Orange was awarded in 2009 and started commercial operations in June 2010, after the 
completion of the TRE. Its impact will be measured by the next round of the TRE.
Mozambique has a marginal positive score with regard to market entry. The positive perception can 
be attributed to the positive score in the VANS component of the survey. The mobile and fixed line 
market received a negative score. This is due to the fact that the fixed line segment has a monopoly 
market structure, while the mobile segment has had a duopoly structure up until 2010 when a third 
mobile licence was granted. Delays in licensing the third mobile operator contributed to the 
negative score in the mobile segment. The overall positive score does not correlate with the market 
outcomes in terms of access and pricing. The country has some of the highest mobile pricing out of 
the countries surveyed and some of the lowest mobile and fixed-line access figures.
The rest of the countries surveyed are perceived as being inefficient in terms of regulation of 
market entry. Ethiopia, for instance, is perceived to be highly inefficient in this regard. This is due to 
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its policy and regulatory framework, which has been closed to competition for the past two 
decades, and all operations continue to be state-owned. The market structure is characterised by a 
vertically integrated monopoly structure where a single operator provides fixed, mobile, Internet 
services and controls the international gateway services. In addition, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency (ETA) is regarded as weak, lacking any real independence from the 
Ministry of transport and communications, which acts as a department within the Ministry. The 
Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for the appointment of the general 
manager and chief executive officer of the incumbent operator ETC. Despite the increase in fixed 
and mobile access through a vendor-sponsored loan agreement between government and the 
Chinese company ZTE, network growth remains unsustainable due to pricing that is fixed politically 
at relatively low levels in comparison to markets that have opened up to competition.
In South Africa, market entry has continued to be stifled by the policy of ‘managed liberalisation’. 
Despite the regulators attempt to shift to a horizontal licensing framework; the market remains 
structured around vertically integrated incumbent operators. The policy and regulatory framework 
within the sector has not adequately addressed dominant operators, though the Competition 
Commission has taken a strong stand against anti-competitive practice. The Competition Tribunal is 
currently hearing a case against Telkom by the value-added network operators. The Competition 
Commission proposed the maximum fine of 10% of revenues – a whopping R3.7 billion (US$). This 
followed a previously successfully appealed court decision in Telkom’s favour challenging the 
Commission’s referral of the case to the Tribunal for a determination. The Commission has also 
expressed its intention to investigate collusive behaviour between the mobile operators.
The market structure arising from the policy reform process over a decade has effectively produced 
duopolies in both the fixed and mobile markets. Further, the vertically integrated fixed-line 
incumbent, Telkom, retains dominance over the backbone. As a result, despite the entry of the 
second public switched network operator, Neotel, prices have not decreased significantly neither 
have services been greatly extended outside of corporate niche markets.
However, state involvement has been varied within the telecommunications market. On the one 
hand, the state has decreased involvement through selling off portions of Telkom and on the other 
hand increased involvement through the creation of an infrastructure company, Broadband Infraco. 
As a result, South Africa is one of the most concentrated markets out of all the countries surveyed, 
with increased state ownership in the sector, contrary to global trends.
Although, South Africa’s overall regulatory efficiency is negatively perceived by stakeholders, the 
country nevertheless has continued to grow its mobile market in particular. While wholesale prices 
are high, its retail prices performed averagely of the countries surveyed. For example, South Africa 
had lower mobile pricing than countries with a positive perception in market entry like Tanzania 
and Uganda. In addition, in 2009 the country had the third highest number of mobile SIM cards as a 
percentage of the population. Although it continues to have amongst the highest levels of fixed 
lines as a percentage of the population, it is experiencing negative growth in this market segment.
In Benin market entry is perceived negatively, although the mobile segment received a positive score 
due to the presence of five mobile operators. On the other-hand the fixed line segment is 
characterised by a monopoly, Benin Telecoms, and very low penetration levels. The negative score in 
the fixed and VANs market negatively impacted on the overall perception of the telecommunications 
regulatory environment with regards to market entry. Furthermore it takes a long time to obtain a 
telecommunications license or permit-up to 410 days, which has contributed to the negative 
perception. Despite the negative perception in Benin of the regulatory environment regarding market 
entry the country has performed better in terms of mobile and fixed line access than countries that 
received a positive score with regards to market entry like Tanzania.
In Zambia market entry is perceived negatively, both with regard to the fixed-line and mobile 
markets. The fixed-line market is characterised by a monopoly. In addition, the government 
reversed its decision to licence a fourth mobile operator and introduced legislation that restricted 
the number of operators to three until 2015. This is believed to be a protectionist strategy and part 
of the deal involving the sale of 75% shares in the state-owned Zamtel to Libya’s state-owned LAP 
Green. Although the Internet sector is considered open to competitors, more than half of the issued 
licences have been un-utilised since 2006. Moreover, the negative perception is expected to 
change following the introduction of a converged licensing regime and liberalisation of the 
international gateway. However, the Government’s issuance of a statutory instrument to limit the 
number of mobile operators to three for the next five years may have confused the message to the 
market vis-à-vis the ICT policy pronouncements to promote competition in market, perceived as a 
justification used extensively in the privatisation of Zamtel.
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Cote d’Ivoire is perceived negatively due to the prohibitively high cost of acquiring 900Mhz and 
1800MHz bands. Operators have not been able to overcome the dominant position of the fixed line 
incumbent and the high cost of terminal equipment has been a major deterrent to investment in 
the Internet segment.
Figure 11: RIA TRE 2009. Market Entry
Market entry in Cameroon is perceived negatively. Despite partial liberalisation in 1998, the mobile 
market is characterised by a duopoly, while the state-owned operator Camtel has a monopoly over 
the fixed-line market. However, the country performed fairly well in terms of fixed-line access 
despite the monopoly market structure. Mobile access figures, on the other hand were low in 
comparison to other countries.
Market entry in Namibia is perceived as marginally negative. However, market entry has been 
assessed more positively compared to 2006, with three mobile operators and several strong 
broadband providers now existent.
Market entry in Senegal is perceived as negative as historically the fixed-line market has been 
dominated by the incumbent operator and the mobile market has been been characterised by a 
duopoly until the market was opened up to a third operator, Expresso, the second national 
operator, which launched early 2009.
With regards to Kenya, the licence fees are considered restrictive and pose a significant barrier to 
market entry for new players. The resultant market structure is an oligopoly in the mobile market 
with only four players. For instance, in the mobile sector, the high price of the 3G licence, i.e. USD 25 
million, gave Safaricom a de facto monopoly over 3G services. The regulator, as a result of 
complaints from the other three operators, was forced to bring it down to USD 10 million. The fixed 
market still only has a monopoly provider, which also owns a significant portion of the largest 
mobile operator, Safaricom. In 2008, Kenya performed very well in terms of mobile pricing, but still 
lags behind other countries in terms of access in both the mobile and fixed market segments.
It is evident that liberalisation and open access are essential elements to stimulate competition and 
market growth. However, these conditions are not sufficient in themselves. There is a need for 
effective regulation of other factors such as tariffs and interconnection in order to facilitate access 
to and increase the affordability of services. For instance, although Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda 
have positive perceptions in terms of market entry, this does not correlate with good market 
performance. Tanzania and Uganda lag behind other markets in terms of fixed and mobile access, 
while Ghana has performed relatively well in mobile access and its mobile prices are the lowest out 
of the countries surveyed.
On the other hand, countries with negative perceptions about regulation of market entry, like 
South Africa, have high mobile and fixed line access figures, although the fixed-line segment has 
been experiencing negative growth. Similarly, Kenya had a negative perception about market entry, 
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Access to Scarce Resources
The management of scarce resources such as spectrum, rights of way and numbering is one of the 
greatest challenges for African regulators. In an increasingly wireless world, access to spectrum is 
becoming the key competitive issue and inability to gain access a major barrier to investment. The 
dilemma around spectrum has impacted negatively on the service expansion capabilities of 
operators, the types of technologies deployed and opportunities for innovation.
Tanzania is the only country of those surveyed that is perceived as being highly efficient with regards 
to regulation of scarce resources. Despite the overall positive view on this matter, some respondents 
wanted timely, transparent and non-discriminatory access to spectrum allocation. Assignment of 
telecommunication numbers (numbering resources) and rights of way; frequency allocation; 
telephone number allocation; and tower/mast locations and safety were also issues of concern.
Mozambique is perceived as relatively efficient in managing scarce resources. The regulation on 
access to scarce resources is based on international standards and follows a first-come-first-serve 
principle. Moreover, this was not able to explain why they ranked negatively in the fixed-line and 
mobile segments. Ghana is considered to be relatively efficient in the regulation of spectrum. A 
liberal policy in the licensing and frequency allocation is provided under the National 
Telecommunication Policy of Ghana. The policy also emphasises co-location and facility sharing 
amongst other things. The policy has eased the usual bureaucracy and reduce restrictions 
on licensing and allocation of frequency spectrum, especially for data and its ancillary services. This 
accounts for the positive score.
The close to neutral score for Tunisia relates to the lack of access to broadband spectrum. The 
allocation of resources for mobile services is regarded as successful.
More than half of the countries surveyed are regarded as inefficient.
Ethiopia is considered highly inefficient in regulating scarce resources, as the regulator has not 
introduced a spectrum plan due to the government’s monopoly over the existing spectrum. 
Therefore, neither spectrum policy nor guidelines for the usage of spectrum commons are in place. 
In South Africa, spectrum availability for new services has been a major source of contention. The 
regulator has made very little progress in the regulation of spectrum, which is a major bottleneck to 
market entry and expansion. Sentech, the state-owned entity, has been sitting on 50 MHz in the 2.6 
GHz band and on a large allocation in the 3.5GHz band. The allocation in the 2.6 GHz band to 
Sentech in 2009 was intended for My Wireless, its wireless broadband offering. However, the project 
was halted in November 2009, following the loss of millions of rands. In March 2010, the 
Department of Communications in South Africa released a spectrum policy. Under the policy, the 
national regulator, ICASA, is obliged to enforce strict measures regarding the use of spectrum. 
Companies that have spectrum are expected to make efficient use of the resource or lose the 
spectrum under the new “use it or lose it” policy. As a result, Sentech is under pressure to use its 
spectrum allocation, especially within the 2.6GHz bands, which is currently being sought after by 
other telecoms operators in order to offer WiMax services, or to return it. The Department of 
Communications indicated in 2009 its intention to conduct a spectrum audit to establish the state 
of current usage against allocations. The time-spans on the project, however, suggest that it may 
take as long as two years, which would cause serious delays in the sector, if major decisions around 
spectrum are held in abeyance until then.
Regulation with regard to scarce resources is considered inefficient in Benin. This is due to the 
absence of effective regulation regarding the management and distribution of frequencies. In 
addition Benin does not have a reliable national frequency distribution table.
In Zambia the management of scarce resources is perceived negatively, despite improvements in 
numbering and frequency management, which has streamlined management of these resources. 
In addition, in 2008 the regulator commissioned a frequency monitoring system worth more than $ 
4 million dollars. The negative perception appears to be related to the fact that the improvements 
are communicated to operators and to a less extent to other stakeholders within the 
telecommunications sector.
Access to scarce resources is perceived negatively in Namibia due to the absence of regulation 
in this area.
The allocation of scarce resources is perceived negatively in Kenya. This is due to the fact that there 
is a perception that people have acquired frequencies for speculation purposes but they are not 
being utilised, creating artificial scarcity.
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The negative perception in Senegal relates to challenges regarding access to spectrum and 
dissatisfaction by operators over the management of frequency bands by the regulator and 
Ministry of ICT.
The negative perception regarding access to scarce resources in Uganda is due to the over-
allocations at the onset of licensing when the market was opening up, as well as non-utilisation of 
allocated spectrum by some licensed entities. The Ugandan Communications Commission (UCC) 
plans to re-farm some spectrum, but its plans are not discussed in the public domain. In addition, 
UCC has become more aggressive in addressing licensees that have delayed the launch of 
operations after having obtained a license.
Figure 12: RIA TRE 2009. Access to scarce resources
In Cote d'Ivoire there is a negative perception due to the decline in the availability of the 
frequencies, particularly the 900 MHz band. In addition there are a plethora of operators competing 
for this scarce resource. However, some operators have stated that there is a lack of transparency 
regarding the allocation of some frequencies, which are termed “golden frequencies” , which has 
contributed to the negative perception.
In Cameroon, management of scarce resources is perceived negatively. This is due to the dispute 
between mobile operators and radio operators over the allocation of the 800 and 900 MHZ 
frequencies, particularly inconsistencies regarding allocation of these resources. Despite these 
challenges, a new 8-digit numbering plan has been successfully implemented.
The management of scarce resources like spectrum, numbers and number portability is critical to 
realising the benefits of competition. Inefficient management of scarce resources remains a 
major hurdle to market growth and operator expansion activities. In most cases, the challenges 
regarding the management of scarce resources are a function of the outmoded policies that 
govern the telecommunications sector and fail to create enabling environments for competition 
and innovation.
Interconnection
Interconnection of the telecom system allows users of one network to interact with others in 
different networks in order to achieve seamless communication. In addition to this, the 
interconnection between new and existing players facilitates competition within a market. 
Mozambique’s positive perception is due to the proactive role played by the regulator in regulating 
interconnection rates, following disputes that arose amongst operators. In 2006 the regulator hired 
an independent consultant to come up with a proposal for interconnection termination rates. A 
new agreement was signed between TDM, Vodacom and Mcel in 2007 for rates that would apply in 
2008 and 2009. In 2010 new interconnection rates were implemented and the government is in the 
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The positive score in Cote d’Ivoire can be attributed to the fact that interconnection is required by 
the regulatory authority ATCI. Interconnection rates are negotiated between operators without the 
interference of the regulator. The contract signed between operators specifies the technical, 
financial and administration conditions for interconnection. Furthermore, operators must follow the 
principle of cost-oriented pricing.
In Tanzania regulation of interconnection rates is perceived as being efficient. This is likely to be the 
result of the effective regulatory intervention in this area. A cost-based interconnection regime has 
been established in Tanzania. The interconnection model is based on a Forward-looking Long Run 
Incremental Cost Model (FLRIC). Interconnection rate regulation came into effect on the first of 
January 2008 and will be reviewed in January 2012. There is complete symmetry for international 
and all national calls, with incoming international calls terminating at local charges on national 
networks as stipulated under the interconnection regulation. Despite, the success of wholesale 
regulation in Tanzania, this has not been passed on to end-users as retail pricing of mobile services 
remains very high.
Figure 13: RIA TRE 2009. Interconnection
In Ghana, The Electronic Communication Act, 2008, Act 775 mandates all licensed public telecom 
operators to interconnect, but companies with significant market share are to provide facilities for 
physical interconnections. At present there are two telecom operators with significant market share, 
namely MTN Ghana and Vodafone, that are required to provide infrastructure for physical 
interconnection. The interconnection regime in Ghana has been undergoing reform for years. An 
interconnection technical committee has been established with the objective of resolving all 
technical problems associated with interconnection. Finally, a model for determining 
interconnection rates was developed by an independent consultant in 2007 and accepted by all 
telecoms operators. The interconnection model is based on Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC). The 
interconnection determination in Ghana accounts for its positive perception.
Cameroon is perceived neutrally with regards to regulation of interconnection. This perception seems 
to be linked to the duopoly situation in the mobile segment. The two mobile operators, namely MTN 
and Orange Cameroon, managed to solve the interconnection issue without any regulatory 
intervention, and therefore termination rates are not a contentious issue for the moment. Users are 
able to communicate on and off net in a seamless matter. The interconnection problem might arise 
with the entrance of the two new mobile operators, announced by the Ministry of P&T in June 2009.
Tunisia again received a neutral score, suggesting an adequate level of regulatory efficiency, but 
greater invention might push this into positive terrain.
The absence of competition in both fixed and mobile markets within Ethiopia means that 
interconnection is not a major pre-occupation and therefore there is no regulation concerning it. 
The operator runs a single seamless network and no termination fee is charged between the 
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In South Africa, in 2009, the Ministry of Communication intervened to address interconnection 
pricing. Also, the parliament challenged the, regulator on its failure to bring down mobile 
termination rates. This has compounded the negative perception of the regulator and raised 
questions around its ability to regulate effectively. The price dropped from R1.25 to 89c following 
the Ministerial recommendation. In addition, operators proposed a further price reduction, but the 
regulator has withstood pressure from operators to accept voluntary reductions in exchange for a 
moratorium on termination price regulation. In April 2010 it issued a draft regulation on wholesale 
termination rates. This is considered a significant step by the regulator and is expected to have a 
positive impact on ICASA’s ability to effectively regulate the market. Any pass through of the 
termination cost reductions to users however as still to be seen.
In Benin the perception is negative due to the absence of any regulation on interconnection 
termination rates. Instead interconnection rates are determined after the negotiation between 
operators under the supervision of the regulatory authority.
In Zambia interconnection regulation is perceived negatively. This is due to Zain’s dominant 
position in the market, which has gone unchecked by the regulator and competition authorities, 
previously Zambian Communications Authority (now Zambian ICT Authority). Zain is believed to 
engage in discriminatory practices by charging different interconnection rates against two 
operators. The Zambia ICT Act of 2009 provides the regulator with powers to intervene in cases 
where there is abuse of power. In addition, a cost study is underway to determine the appropriate 
interconnection regime.
Table 13: Interconnection Determination by regulator on 17th Sept 2010 in Zambia
1 Nov. 2010 1 Jan. 2011 1 Jan. 2012
Mobile to Fixed Termination Voice USc 5.90 USc 5.30 USc 5.00
Zambia Kwacha Equivalent K 295.00 K 265.00 K 250.00
Mobile and Fixed Termination-SMS K 147.50 K 132.50 K 125.00
Although Kenya was one of the earlier regulators to conduct a cost assessment of prices, it lags 
Uganda and Tanzania in such interventions which might explain why the regulator is perceived as 
relatively inefficient in regulating of interconnection, despite having one of the lowest 
interconnection rates in the fixed and mobile segments, and resulting low retail prices. The 
Commission issued a determination on cost-based interconnection, which came into effect on the 
1 March 2007 and is binding to all fixed and mobile operators and a further study is underway. The 
interconnection rates are based on a glide path and is to be implemented under three phases. The 
reduction in interconnection rates in the second phase with the entry of Orange Kenya and Yu led 
to a reduction in end user tariffs between operators. The reduced interconnection rates under the 
second phase resulted in tariff wars, and existing operators introduced a number of promotional 
offers that did not comply with the interconnection guidelines. Although operators are required to 
file tariffs under the current interconnection regime, the regulation does not make provision for 
promotional activities. This has been a source of contention and resulted in complaints about anti-
competitive behaviour.
Botswana is regarded as inefficient in regulating interconnection and facility rates. This is because 
BTC, the fixed-line incumbent, has a monopoly over the infrastructure backbone and all operators’ 
lease facilities from BTC. The failed negotiations between BTC and other operators over access to 
infrastructure are the main challenge for the regulator. In response, the regulator introduced new 
licences that permit operators to build their own infrastructure backbone. In addition to this, the 
regulator is commissioning a study on infrastructure sharing and its implications on enhancing 
connectivity in the rural areas. With regards to interconnection fees, BTA does not set fixed 
interconnection rates, but provides a minimum and maximum fee that can be charged. Operators 
can then charge any price within the range. Although Botswana’s mobile pricing is relatively lower 
than other countries, high interconnection rates for mobile-to-mobile calls have driven up mobile 
pricing, which has contributed to Botswana’s negative perception. In contrast, Botswana’s fixed to 
mobile interconnection rate is one of lowest out of the countries surveyed, owing to BTC’s 
monopoly over fixed-line services. 
Namibia is perceived marginally negatively in the regulation of interconnection, despite the 
resolution of a termination rate dispute in 2009. In July 2009 the Namibian Communications 
Commission ruled that termination rates should be standardised to 60 cents a minute and fall to 30 
cents by January 2011.
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In Uganda, the regulator is perceived to be relatively inefficient in regulating interconnection. The 
Ugandan Communications Commissions (UCC) approach in the past been ex-post, allowing 
operators to enter into commercial agreements (cost based or otherwise) and intervening only if 
such negotiations fail to result in agreement or a dispute arises. With the opening up of the market 
and resultant increase in competition, incumbents used interconnection rates to create barriers to 
entry, offering unattractive interconnection rates, which negatively impact smaller players. In 
response to these challenges, the regulator decided to adopt a cost-based price control of call 
termination and transmission capacity, effective from November 2009. A bottom-up model was 
chosen under the incremental cost modelling approach of determination of interconnection rates. 
In addition to this the UCC enforced accounting separation to address problems associated with 
wholesale leased-lines provision. This applies to facilities or infrastructure that UCC may have 
designated as an essential facility.  However, the regulator needs to address its capacity issues in 
order to effectively enforce its regulations according to industry observers.
Senegal has a negative perception as interconnection up until 2009 remained an unresolved issue.
Although there have been interconnection determinations in Tanzania, Uganda, these have not 
translated into lower retail pricing. Instead, mobile pricing is significantly higher than other 
countries, and largely due to their retrogressive tax regime on mobile services. In South Africa, there 
is uncertainty over the impact of the interconnection determination (early 2010) on retail pricing.
Tariff Regulation
Tariff regulation is regarded overwhelmingly as an area of ineffective regulation. High tariff rates 
have been a key barrier to access telecommunication services and often a key indicator of the lack 
of competition. In the interests of achieving universal access objectives, regulators are challenged 
to establish effective tariff regulation in order to remove the barriers to market growth and access 
to services.
Despite not having particularly low prices, Mozambique is the only country perceived to have efficient 
tariff regulation. This result seems related to the intervention by the regulator to settle mobile tariffs 
based on cost. The regulator requested each operator to come up with a cost-based tariff proposal for 
negotiation and it succeeded in reaching consensus based on the operators proposals.
The majority of countries are perceived to have inefficient tariff regulation. South Africa is rated the 
most inefficient regulator out of all the countries surveyed. While fixed lines and ADSL prices have 
been the subject of regulatory intervention in the past, it has nevertheless left them high by 
international standards, as demonstrated in the pricing section above. Furthermore, mobile retail 
prices have not been regulated, with claims by the operators that the market is sufficiently 
competitive. However, mobile pricing is relatively high in comparison to other countries, 
considering the high penetration levels and the associated economies of scale and scope.
Ethiopia is also considered to be highly inefficient as tariffs are set by the Ministry and are politically 
determined rather than cost-based.
In Cameroon pricing is not regulated and is determined by the dominant operators MTN and 
Orange. The withdrawal of the promise to set a price cap by the General Manager of the Regulatory 
Board if the operators did not become reasonable on pricing has contributed to the negative 
perception as customers are increasingly vulnerable to high prices due to the lack of competition. 
In Senegal dominant players have historically set prices and this has gone unregulated, which 
accounts for the negative perception in the 2009 survey.
Benin has a negative perception due to the absence of tariff regulation. The regulatory authority 
conducted a study in 2009 which showed a significant margin between costs and tariffs charged by 
operators. Although operators are free to set their own prices, rates charged must be cost oriented. 
Also, Uganda is perceived as inefficient in regulating tariffs. Mobile pricing remained high despite 
the adoption of an interconnection determination. This can be attributed to the 30% duty levied on 
cell phones and services, which significantly raises mobile prices.
Tariff regulation in Namibia is perceived negatively since there has not been any. MTC has been able to 
create club effects using high off-net/on-net price differential and bundled on-net minutes and SMS.
The inability of the Zambian regulator to regulate tariffs and Zain’s dominant position accounts for 
the negative perception. The new ICT bill of 2009 compels regulator to protect consumer welfare 
against high tariff rates, which is likely to change the perception in the future.
Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation
34
High tariffs
have been a major 
barrier to access 
telecommunication 
services and often a 
key indicator of the 
lack of competition.
Tariffs in Kenya are still very high due to the lack of competition. In addition, the regulator has 
encountered a number of obstacles in bringing down tariffs. One of the main obstacles is the 
resistance from the dominant mobile operator, Safaricom. Its resistance has resulted in the 
suspension of the implementation of the new regulation about tariffs, despite the new framework 
having been published within the government gazette.
Figure 14: RIA TRE 2009 – Tariff regulation
In Ghana, regulation regarding tariffs is perceived as inefficient. Apart from the fixed-line segment, 
whose tariffs are regulated, the telecommunications policy left the determination of mobile prices 
to market forces. The only case where the regulator intervened was in relation to the high cost of 
international bandwidth on the club consortium SAT3 facility. In this case, the regulator intervened 
as a result of vigourous lobbying by the Internet Services Providers (ISPs). Consequently, the price of 
2 megabytes duplex dropped from USD 12,000 a month to USD 4,500.
In Botswana, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority regulates tariffs by setting a ceiling on 
prices. As a result, operators can charge anything below the set price. However, mobile prices are 
considered to be high and thus the regulator is perceived as inefficient in regulating tariffs. 
However, the regulator commissioned a study, which looks at developing a cost and pricing 
framework for Botswana. The model is supposed to be implemented towards the end of 2010.
In Cote d’Ivoire tariff regulation is perceived negatively due to the absence of tariff regulation. 
Operators set the prices, while the regulator acts as an arbitrator to protect consumer interests. 
Moreover there have been large variations in the pricing of services within the same market 
segment, which affects consumers. As a result, the regulator is conducting a study to determine a 
price model that will be beneficial to all operators.
Tanzania is considered to be relatively inefficient in regulating tariffs. The country has one of the 
highest mobile prices out of all the countries surveyed, despite reducing the call termination rate. 
Additional levies and taxes have driven up tariff rates. In fact, telecom equipment is subject to 20% 
import duty and 20% VAT and 7% tax is levied on mobile airtime. 
The negative perceptions about tariff regulation do not have a uniform impact in terms of pricing 
across the different countries. For instance, Ghana is perceived to be inefficient in regulating tariffs, 
but has the lowest mobile prices out of all the countries surveyed. The low ranking of tariff 
regulation in Ghana is based on the fact many subscribers want the regulator to play a more pivotal 
role in mobile pricing rather than leaving it to the market, which they think might not serve their 
interest. Further, there is still a strong perception that prices could still come down as the operators 
have not hit the end of the pricing mechanism. These underlined the poor rating of tariff regulation 
in Ghana. Ethiopia’s mobile pricing is fairly low, despite the absence of regulation on tariffs. Instead 
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Regulation of Anti-Competitive Practices
The ability of the regulator to prevent anti-competitive behaviour is a key determinant of 
investment for new entrants. Operators with significant market power are able to engage in 
predatory pricing practices, thereby undermining smaller players, which is deemed anti-
competitive practice.
In Botswana the positive perception in anti-competitive practices is due to the high score under 
the VANS market. The fixed line market had a marginally positive score whilst the score in the 
mobile sector was negative. B-mobile is perceived to have an unfair advantage in the market in 
terms of pricing and the range of services offered – it is the mobile arm of the incumbent operator. 
Although, there is increased competition in the fixed-line market, the incumbent Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation maintains dominance over the market.
The positive score in Mozambique relates to the facilitative role played by the regulator in splitting 
the incumbent operator TDM and MCel, its mobile arm, into two separate companies prior to the 
entry of Vodacom as the second national operator. In addition there have been no disputes over 
anti-competitive behaviour. The moderate negative score in the fixed and mobile markets can be 
attributed to the fact that in the past the regulator has been reactive as opposed to being proactive 
with regard to regulating anti-competitive behaviour in the past.
The majority of the countries in the figure above were regarded as ineffective in the regulation of anti-
competitive practices. In the case of Ethiopia, there is no regulation on anti-competitive behaviour 
due to the absence of competition in the mobile, fixed and the Internet market segments.
In South Africa, despite the entry of new market participants, the incumbent operator retains 
dominance over the backbone. There have been several complaints of uncompetitive practices 
lodged with the regulator against Telkom, from whom downstream operators were required for many 
years to acquire their facilities. Despite several challenges by competitors to Telkom, and the regulator 
ICASA ruling against Telkom, these have been taken on review by the incumbent. Some reviews have 
been successful on procedural grounds, while others cases have languished in the courts for year. As a 
result, a number of disputes have been brought before the Competition Commission. In South Africa, 
comments in relation to the negative perceptions about anti-competitive behaviour appear to refer to 
the regulator and not the policy and regulatory environment as a whole. It is important to note that 
the Competition Commission is often overlooked when assessing the regulatory environment, 
although it has had a number of successes.
Namibia has a negative perception regarding anti-competitive practices is perceived negatively 
due to the fact that the NCC has not been able regulating tariffs and also does not have regulatory 
power over Telecom Namibia, which is reported as having acted anti-competitively in the past.
In Zambia, the negative perception of anti-competitive practices relates to the lack of regulation of 
Zain’s dominant market position. However, a new legal framework for regulating anti-competitive 
practices has been provided in the new ICT bill, which came into effect in December 2009. This 
expected to provide the regulator and the competition authority with necessary legal powers to 
institute effective economic regulation in the sector.
In Benin, some of the operators have complained that the sales promotions for products and 
services are uncompetitive and that competitors were engaging in unfair competition. Anti-
competitive behaviour pertaining to sales promotion was unregulated until October 2009, which 
accounts for the negative perception. Following growing complaints from GSM operators, the 
Transitional Regulatory Authority for Post and Telecommunications took a decision to regulate the 
practice of sales promotions. Decision No. 022/ATRPT/PT/SE/DAJC/SA includes procedures for 
organising sales promotion products and telecommunications services in Benin. the sales 
promotion of products or services of telecommunication are now subject to prior approval from 
the regulatory authority.
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Figure 15: RIA TRE 2009. Regulation of Anti-competitive practices
In Senegal the regulator does not regulate anti-competitive practices and does not have the 
scientific tools to do so, which accounts for the negative perception.
In Uganda the perception of anti-competitive behaviour is negative because dominant operators 
tend to influence the way the market operates and since the regulator has a hands-off approach, 
stepping in only when the players fail to agree, it is easier for dominant players to have their way. A 
good case in point was when the regulator tried to set a base-interconnection rate for mobile 
telephony across networks and one of the major players went to court to challenge them. Later the 
matter was settled out of court, which creates the impression that the regulator does not 
adequately address anti-competitiveness.
In Cameroon, regulation of anti-competitive behaviour has not been a priority for the regulator, 
given the market structure of a duopoly in the mobile market and monopoly in the fixed-line 
market, which accounts for its negative perception. The announced entrance of two new mobile 
operators, however, is expected to impact on the operator’s behaviour. It can be anticipated that 
the two main operators will try to protect their dominant positions by adopting predatory pricing 
practices. The engagement in anti-competitive practices will require the Ministry of P&T to monitor 
and perhaps regulate this dimension.
In Kenya, despite the introduction of competition into the telecommunications market, incumbent 
operators continue to dominate the market. Furthermore, the regulator has not taken up its full 
mandate to regulate uncompetitive practices. A bottleneck of the regulation of anti-competitive 
practices is the lack of a clear definition of what is considered a dominant operator. Consequently, 
operators that command significant market power are able to behave anti-competitively.
In Ghana, one of the main unresolved regulatory issues is the high cost of leased facilities and 
preferential treatment being experienced by Vodafone Broadband4U for SAT3 connection from the 
parent company. As a result, prices for access to SAT3 are not uniform for all operators. The current 
situation has resulted in distortions in Internet pricing. For example, Vodafone Broadband4U price 
for 512kb is US$39 per month, while Internet Ghana and Busy Internet (shared) charge US$ 274 and 
US$350 per month respectively. The ISPs have argued strongly that Vodafone Broadband4U cannot 
charge or Internet pricing will not be sustainable it pays same price for 2mb duplex link on SAT3. 
There is another argument that since there is no separation of accounting system among the three 
services (fixed line, mobile telephone and broadband Internet) provided by Vodafone, the 
likelihood of cross-subsidisation of services within the company may be possible. This situation has 
prevented the entry of effective competition in the broadband Internet market
The negative perception of Tunisia with regard to the regulation of anti-competitive practices 
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Cote d’Ivoire’s negative perception can be attributed to the fact that the body responsible for 
arbitration over disputes – CTCI – suffers from a lack of execution. A Competition Commission has 
been created but is currently non-functional, and therefore the abuse of dominant positions and 
other anti-competitive practices are not addressed.
In the majority of the countries surveyed, the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has 
not been accompanied by regulation of anti-competitive behaviour from dominant operators. As a 
result, penetration rates in Africa remain low in comparison to other regions. Therefore, regulators 
are challenged to regulate anti-competitive behaviour in order to keep the markets competitive 
and attract new market entrants and investors, thereby stimulating market growth.
Universal Service Obligations
In order to promote ICT investment in under-served areas, African countries have adopted Universal 
Access principles, with the intention of providing access to ICT services within marginalised 
communities. Universal Access Funds (UAFs) were created with the objective of subsidising 
telecommunications operators to boost investment activities related to ICT infrastructure 
development and extension to perceived non-profitable areas.
Although several countries have established UAFs and often dedicated agencies to ensure their 
implementation, these have not yielded the intended results. On the one hand, there have been 
regulatory bottlenecks regarding access to and allocation of the money, such as the absence of 
processes and procedures regarding how the UAFs function. As a result, there have been 
discrepancies between funds collected and the actual amount disbursed. Billions of dollars that 
could have been deployed remain under-utilised in UAFs across the continent. In addition, there 
have been delays in the disbursement of funds due to lengthy bureaucratic processes. 
Botswana is perceived as highly efficient regarding regulation on universal access. The positive 
perception seems to relate to increased awareness of the Universal Access Policy draft, which is yet 
to be tabled before cabinet. In addition, evidence of the outcomes of universal access initiatives is 
yet to be seen.
While, the perception in Mozambique is positive regarding the regulation of universal access, this 
does not correlate with the outcomes of the project. A universal access fund was established in 
2004 and became operational in 2006. However, none of the funds were disbursed until 2008 with 
only about a quarter of the money spent. Organisational challenges and limited capacity has 
hampered the effective management of the fund. The universal access and service unit is run by a 
single person who is responsible for the technical, financial and administrative aspects of the 
universal access fund. In addition, the institution lacks clear and simplified procedures on 
submission and selection criteria for universal access project proposals.
In Tunisia the development of basic telecom access to cover urban as well as rural population has 
always been a major priority of the Tunisian Socio-economic Development policies for the last 40 
years. This priority has been confirmed in the telecom code of 2002 and 2008. The latest one 
adopted the nomenclature of Universal access for basic services.
Tunisia established universal service obligations in 2001, with the objective of extending minimum 
telephone services to citizens all over the country and to provide a free of charge routing service for 
emergency calls. Also, the two main operators are required to publish a directory of subscribers, in 
print or electronic form. The legislative framework takes into account only the availability of the 
telecommunications services (i.e. to provide an equal level of basic communications service all over 
the country), but it does not mention issues of affordability and accessibility. The positive 
perception of Tunisia with regard to universal access obligations might be due to the 2008 
telecommunication Act (Act no. 2008-1) which replaced the concept of basic telecommunications 
services, defined in the 2001 law, with those one of universal service. However, despite this formal 
commitment to improve the programme through the inclusion of aspects related to affordability 
and accessibility, so far the list of obligations did not develop from 2001. It might be attributed to a 
ministerial delay, since the list of universal service obligations has to be defined by order of the 
Ministry of telecommunication. Tunisia did not establish a universal access and service fund, but 
through obligations for operators a minimum access and free of charge relief communications have 
been achieved. However, the achieved minimum access relates to a geographical coverage of 
telecommunications services rather than to the usage of the services by the population.
Cote d'Ivoire is perceived as neutral in terms of universal access and service. Within three (03) sectors, 
universal service obligation is situated under a strategic plan developed by government. Carrying out 
this process will, in the near future, lead to telecommunication services and products being accessible 
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to the whole population living in the national territory. The Fonds National des Telecommunications 
(FNT) was instituted with this in mind. Currently, each telecommunications company sets itself up in 
accordance with its target market in view of the profitability of its investments.
In Tanzania, the perception regarding universal access and service is perceived marginally positive. 
Since liberalisation of the telecommunication sector in Tanzania in 2003, for obvious reasons, major 
investments and developments have happened in major cities and towns. So far, no significant 
investments have taken place in rural areas. Although the Universal Communications Service 
Access Act has been in place since 2006, the Universal Access Fund was only established in 2009. It 
is the process for the mobilisation of such funds that has generated public awareness and interest 
in this subject. So far, not much has been achieved. The incumbent (state owned) communication 
operator TTCL, is expected to be the precursor in this venture. Unfortunately, it seems to lack the 
vigour and innovation commensurate with USO challenges. TTCL has been a follower rather than a 
pioneer in the mobile communication sector which has the greatest potential to fulfil universal 
service obligation requirements.
South Africa is perceived as highly inefficient in the regulation of universal access. Despite the 
appointment of new leadership in the renamed Universal Service Agency of South Africa (USASA), it 
is still dealing with definitions of "universal access" and "needy people" which have yet to be 
determined by the Minister as required by the 1996 legislation. Despite longstanding universal 
services levies amounting to billions of rands, various initiatives, such as under-serviced licences, 
public Internet terminals and supply-side driven tele-centres have proved unsuccessful.
The absence of universal obligations in preceding years accounts for the negative perception in 
Zambia. Only in 2009, with the adoption of the ICT Act, Zambia makes provision for the 
establishment of a universal service fund.
In Ethiopia, a Universal Access policy and strategy is absent. However, the incumbent operator has 
made progress in providing access to underserved areas through its rural infrastructure rollout project.
In Namibia a universal access fund has not been established which accounts for the negative perception.
Benin has a negative perception due to the absence of a universal service fund and regulation on 
universal access and service, although operators are required to pay 1 % of their turnover each year 
to the regulator in order to establish a universal access fund.
Figure 16: RIA TRE 2009. Universal Service Obligations
In Cameroon, the negative perception of the regulation of universal service obligations is as a result of 
the absence of a policy targeted at expanding communication services in rural and perceived 
uneconomic areas. In addition, the government tele-centre strategy has been criticised for yielding 
poor results. The government announced that it was launching 2000 tele-centres by the 2010 as part 
of its universal and access strategy. In 2009, less than 200 tele-centres were set up and there has been 
controversy over the manner in which the tele-centres are managed. Another consideration might 
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the Ministry of P&T about who was in charge to manage billions of CFA francs paid by the telecom 
operators every year as their USO contributions. In 2006, the National Assembly passed a Law giving 
the control over USO money to the Ministry. Since then, every year, the Ministry launches a call to 
proposals for various realisations targeting rural populations or underprivileged areas. The score shows 
that the beneficial effect still yet to be ripped.
Despite the perception, the government has adopted the Universal Access principles and claims to 
provide access to ICT services to all citizens by year 2025.
The poor perception of universal access regulation in Kenya reflects that there was not strategy 
until 2009. The amended Communications (Amendment) Act 2009 allowed for the establishment 
of a universal service fund from a levy on licensees but this has not yet been implemented. This has 
received resistance from the mobile operators because in their view they are meeting the universal 
service obligations but according to CCK sector statistics (March 2010) the mobile population 
coverage is 84.5% but the land coverage is only 34%.
With regard to universal service and access obligations, the licence obligation required TKL 
(incumbent) to install 285,000 and 25,000 new lines in urban and rural areas respectively during the 
period of exclusivity (June 1999 to June 2004). The company was also supposed to increase the 
number of pay-phones by 22,500. TKL failed to meet these minimum targets stipulated in the 
licence. This failure was supposed to attract a fine of Kshs 58 million which is far less than the 
amount it would have cost TKL to roll-out 200,000 additional lines. The two mobile service providers 
Safaricom and Celtel, had rollout obligations as well, but these have been attained and even 
surpassed. Celtel had connected 600,000 subscribers, a figure above the obligation requirement of 
345,354 lines by December 2003. Celtel had the obligation to install 1,000 fixed public pay-phones 
but had managed only 814 by the end of 2003.
In 2003, Uganda launched a rural access program. The funding for the Rural Communications 
Development Program (RCDP) is derived from the 1% levy of gross annual revenue of the operators. 
This is supplemented by donor support and grants from organisations such as the World Bank as 
well as other allocations by Ugandan Communications Commission. The Fund has recorded total 
annual receipts of up to US$3million and utilisation of these is around 85%.
A number of projects have been implemented through the RCDP as shown in the table below. 
Although the program has been widely acclaimed and has fulfilled a number of its objectives as 
shown in the table, the performance is perceived as inefficient, since the impact assessment of its 
activities in the communities in which they have been implemented and towards national 
development is not yet known. However, UCC has commissioned a study to assess this impact.
In Senegal the performance is perceived 
slightly inefficient. In fact, despite a 2007 
Act provides the legal framework for the 
establishment of the universal access fund 
it became operational only in 2010. During 
this year, a total amount of only 7 billion 
FCFA from a 3% levy on operators’ turnover 
has been collected, but it has not been 
disbursed yet.
In Ghana, the Electronic Communica-tions 
Act of 2008, provided a legal basis for 
universal access obligations in the country. 
The Act established the Ghana Investment 
Fund for Electronic Communication 
(GIFEC) as an independent body to 
manage the country’s universal access 
fund. The GIFEC is considered inefficient in 
regulation of the fund due to the large 
amounts of unspent money within the 
fund. Between 2005–2008, GIFEC ’s 
revenues stood at GH¢18,300,000 (US
$17.62m) out of which GH¢2,236,000 (US
$2.03m) representing 12.2% had been 
spent over the period. (Any figures) on 
universal access related projects.
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Internet Points of Presence 76
Internet Cafés 99
ICT Training centres 79
Web Portals 78
Public Pay Phones 2599
Research projects 6
Postal support projects 35
Multipurpose Community
Tele-centres 24
School ICT facilities 95
Health ICT facilities 43
Call centres 1
Content development nil




The level of quality of service is a reflection of the overall regulation of all the aspects within the 
telecommunications sector. The quality of service is also influenced by the level of investment in 
infrastructure and network rollout; the number of competitors and prevailing interconnection 
regime. In addition, level of quality of service has a direct impact on customer church levels.
In Cote d’Ivoire quality of service is perceived as efficient. This opinion is mainly justified by:
• the conformity of equipment/terminals to GSM/UIT standard for mobile telephones;
• the conformity of technical equipment to GSM standards, call quality, connection speed for 
fixed line telephones;
• connection speed depending on the speed of the connection subscribed to for Internet 
access provision.
As for Internet access provision, service quality (connection speed) for shared offers, in other words 
Individual Solutions, as a general rule, is not that suitable for certain Solutions subscribed to. The 
observation of the constraint of service quality is rather for dedicated speeds of company solutions.
The advent of the CDMA technology by Arobase Telecom in the fixed telephone sector has heavily 
boosted and stimulated the services offered to clients and in reaction to the quality, even leading 
the incumbent operator to procure it.
In order to assess the global service quality of the five (05) mobile networks in operation, the ATCI 
commissions an annual audit. The 2009 classification details of the operators are presented in the 
table below.
Table 15: 2009 service quality classification of GSM networks in Côte d’Ivoire
Mobile Networks
Elements of Evaluation Orange CI Moov CI MTN CI Comium CI GreenN
Best network – general classification 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Best network – classification over Abidjan 4th 1st 2nd 5th 3rd
Best Radio Coverage 2nd 5th 1st 3rd 4th
Best Network Availability 2nd 1st 5th 3rd 4th
Best VOICE Service 2nd 1st 3rd 4th 5th
Best SMS Service 1st 3rd 4th 2nd 5th
Best DATA Service 1st 2nd 4th 5th 3rd
Source: ATCI (2009), audit report on quality of mobile networks in Côte d’Ivoire, reorganised data
Orange CI is classified as the best mobile network in Côte d’Ivoire in 2009.
In Botswana, operators are required to submit monthly network performance reports to the 
regulator detailing the status and performance of their networks in terms of set parameters of 
quality of service. This has resulted in a positive perception of the regulator with regards to quality 
of service. In order to protect, consumers the regulator carries out investigations on the use of 
telecommunication equipment in order to determine the state of illegal operations within the 
telecommunications market.
In Tanzania the perception on quality of service is positive. The liberalisation of the communication 
sector coupled with good regulatory and legal framework has created an attractive environment 
for new entrants in the business. The resulting competition has forced improvements in the quality 
of service as well as lowering the cost of communication. The mobile phone has touched the lives 
of majority households in Tanzania. The public perception on ‘quality of service’ is mainly shaped by 
the quality of the basic service, namely the ability to communicate. It is possible that if the quality of 
each type of service was rated, the results could be different. Customer service, for one leaves much 
to be desired.
Mozambique’s positive score does not reflect the real situation. There have been frequent violations of 
quality parameters without any disciplinary measures taken by the regulator, although the 
telecommunications act empowers the regulatory authority to put in place control mechanisms 
regarding quality of service. For example MCel’s quality of service is widely perceived to be poor went 
unpenalised until 2010. One possible explanation for the positive score could be that there are 
currently visible efforts towards the establishment of a regulatory framework for quality of service. 
According to a recent note from INCM, the draft document has been prepared for approval.
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Figure 17: RIA TRE 2009. Quality of services
In Ethiopia, if compared with the RIA TRE 2006, the quality of services has been falling. The low 
quality of service is a result of the overall bad performance of the telecommunications regulatory 
environment. Despite improved network penetration over the last five years, through a vendor 
sponsored loan programme, the incumbent monopoly did not have an incentive to improve the 
quality of service due to lack of competitive pressures and inherent inefficiency.
Regulation of quality of service is perceived negatively in Zambia, although the regulator 
formulated quality of service standards for fixed and mobile voice services and invested in a quality 
of service monitoring system independent of the operators. This has not resulted in significant 
improvements in the quality of services. In addition, the failure of the regulator to impose penalties 
in line with the standards has contributed to the negative perception. Moreover, the regulator is 
compelled under the new ICT Bill to protect consumer welfare against poor quality of service.
In Zambia the Authority recognises the need to protect the interests of consumers of ICT services 
and therefore endeavours to closely monitor the provision of licensed telecom services. While the 
quality of experience is critical to consumer satisfaction, the Authority recognises that matched 
quality of service and network performance are equally important for an effective quality of service 
framework. The licensing framework provides for licensed operators to offer a minimum level of 
quality of service as stipulated by the Authority.
In order to assess the quality of service level from a user’s point of view, the Authority has invested 
in an advanced quality of service monitoring system, independent from the operators, and it 
installed monitoring stations in Livingstone, Lusaka and Kitwe to continuously and objectively 
measure the quality of service against parameters such as speed, accuracy and dependability as per 
ITU E.431 recommendation. Specifically, call success rate, SMS delivery time and voice quality are 
some prominent parameters measured.
In the past, enforcement of quality of service standards has been constrained by low penalties. As a 
result, the Authority resorted to a name and shame strategy in lieu of a comprehensive penalty 
system. This situation has been remedied with the enactment of the Zambia ICT Act of 2009, which 
empowers the regulator to effectively monitor and enforce quality of service standards.
The Authority will soon implement the quality of service framework that would ensure that the 
quality of service and Network Performance parameters are closely matched. This would ensure 
adherence to license conditions as well as improve consumer protection.
South Africa’ s negative perception relates to the absence on regulation on quality of service 
in telecommunications.
In Benin the perception of quality of services is negative due to customer complaints about the 
quality of service on both fixed and mobile networks. Other complaints include a low signal in 
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In Kenya, the quality of mobile calls has not been addressed adequately. It is considered the main 
challenge in the mobile segment. Also, the quality of service for ISPs needs to be defined and 
benchmarked. In 2007 the CCK implemented a quality of service monitoring system called Q-voice, 
at a cost of Kshs 50 million (USD 760 000), the expected benefits of which have not been achieved. 
This could be partly due to a lack of a structured method of communication between customers 
and the regulator in the past. However, in the past two years a dedicated directorate of consumer 
affairs was set up to deal with consumer issues, though there are no evident positive results as yet. 
The CCK is actively educating consumers through their website on their rights in relation to quality 
of services on communication services from the providers.
In Namibia the negative perception about quality of service can be attributed to customer 
complaints on the quality of service on mobile networks, including dropped calls and congestion 
on networks. In addition, there is no regulation or process in place to monitor quality of service.
Uganda has a negative perception regarding quality of service because this issue has not been at 
the forefront of the regulatory agenda. Although the regulator supposedly monitored quality of 
service, results were not published in publicly accessible media. As a result, users could not easily 
compare the performance of different providers in any meaningful way. The regulator has started to 
increasingly pay attention to quality of service issues, partly due to a rise in consumer complaints 
through consumer lobby groups. The regulatory authority, UCC, has started to publish some quality 
of service information under its “name and shame” policy, which compares the performance of 
different providers across a number of metrics in the public media.
In Ghana, where mobile subscribers represent 85% of the total telephone subscribers, the quality of 
services has not been adequately addressed by the regulator. Issues such as dropped calls, traffic 
congestions and poor reception among others still persist in this market segment. Taking into 
account the good performance in market entry, most operators have embarked on a subscription 
drive without a corresponding expansion in their network capacities, and it has created network 
congestions. In November 2007, following a series of complaints on the level of quality of services, 
the regulator imposed heavy fines on MTN and GT OneTouch (now Vodafone Ghana). The operators 
were ordered to improve the quality of their networks or face further sanctions. However, the 
regulator withdrew the directive after few months without any significant improvement in the 
quality of service. The regulator has been unable to apply sanctions for non-compliance or improve 
the quality of services.
Senegal is perceived as inefficient in regulating quality of service although the level of quality of 
service is monitored throughout the year by the Regulation Agency of Telecoms and Post (ARTP). 
However the regulation is not effective because the group responsible for monitoring quality of 
service does not work closely with the Consumer's Association. As a result, consumers that 
experience poor quality of service are not aware of the existence of regulation and do not have a 
channel to voice their complaints.
While the quality of services in Tunisia for mobile has been regarded as acceptable, in the area of 
broadband there has been a negative perception of regulation of quality of service. The quality is 
uneven, speed erratic and deployment is insufficient in some areas and/or regions. Low bandwidth 
contributed to low quality of service. Quality of service has improved following increases in 
bandwidth availability.
In Cameroon, the negative score is attributed to a decrease in the quality of service perceived by 
users. This negative situation reflects both a regulatory impasse in addressing the quality of service, 
and the increase of the number of subscribers using an inadequate infrastructure. In order to 
improve network capacity, the incumbent is investing in fibre optic. This roll out of this public 
funded infrastructure is expected to improve the quality of service and to prevent the frequent 
overlapping and breakdown of conversations.
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While Africa’s telecommunications sector continues to grow, outcomes are sub-optimal in 
comparison to other regions of the world. While growth of the mobile market has been dramatic, 
sub-Saharan countries lag behind many other developing regions, including North Africa. For 
almost 15 years, the telecommunications sector has been part of the multi-lateral trade of services 
agenda. As a result, several African countries have undergone a telecommunications reform process 
in order to meet international trade agreements, including the functional separation of 
government, the sectors’ regulator and operators. However, the reform process has been uneven 
across the continent. Although most reform processes in Africa are incomplete, a number of 
regulators have adopted unified/converged licence regimes in order to keep up with the trend of 
convergence of technology world wide.
Despite rhetorical commitments by governments to regional integration, regional economic 
communities are struggling to integrate their economies as well as their telecommunications 
regulatory frameworks. This can be attributed to national priorities take precedence over regional 
objectives. East Africa, however, continues to demonstrate the benefits of regional integration, most 
recently through the termination of roaming charges within the region. Other operators within the 
region have replicated the One Network initiated by Zain, formerly Celtel and now Bharti-Airtel.
In recognition of the role ICT plays in stimulating economic growth and development, some Africa 
countries have adopted ICT-led development policies and are undergoing reforms in order to 
stimulate foreign investment in infrastructure. In most markets in which such data is available, the rate 
of growth of the ICT sector is considerably faster than the overall rate of economic growth. and the 
contribution to GDP is expanding to give a major sector in some of the more dynamic ICT markets in 
East and West Africa. The drivers for increased ICT revenue can be attributed to the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector, which opened up markets to competition, driving down prices and 
extending the range of services available, especially when supported by effective regulation.
While the private sector has led ICT investment on the continent over the last decade, the return of 
state involvement is evident with governments increasingly playing a lead role in financing 
backbone infrastructure, either through the deployment of state capital or through public-private 
initiatives. With the onset of the global economic crises and the retraction of European investment 
interest, Africa has witnesses the rise of a new set of multinational investors from emerging 
economies, namely India and China.
This comparative study highlighted the fact that despite most of the African countries having partially 
or fully liberalised their telecommunications sectors to some degree, access and affordability of 
services remain uneven and very low when compared with other regions of the world.
The fixed-line sector continues to show no signs of recovery as most countries experienced 
negative growth between 2006 and 2008. Failure to liberalise the fixed-line segments, extended 
monopolies and ineffectual regulation of the incumbent account for low penetration rates. 
Sequencing problems, including the delays in the establishment of autonomous regulators and the 
failure to open up markets prior to privatisation undermined the extension of fixed services. In the 
face of rapidly deployable wireless technologies by new market entrants when markets were 
opened, with innovative pricing that tapped into the demand for low access charge, affordable 
communications services made it very difficult for fixed networks with huge sunk costs and high 
access prices to compete with mobile phone services.
The cost of communications remains high across the continent, putting it out of reach of the 
general African population. The input cost of communications into other services and industries 
continues to be a barrier to investment and improved growth through the deployment of 
competitively priced communication services to improve the efficient supply of goods and 
services. In addition, sector specific policies, such as universal service levies and special taxes on ICT 
equipment and services drive up the costs of services. Wholesales charges for leased lines and 
international bandwidth continue to be way above cost, as are interconnection rates in most 
countries, contributing to stifling of competition and high prices for end users.
Mobile penetration rates continue to demonstrate significant growth, but these figures tend to 
mask the fact that millions of Africans still do not own their own means of communication or 
cannot afford to use mobiles. Despite the high proliferation of low-cost handsets, in some poorer 
sub-Saharan African countries like Uganda and Tanzania penetration remains low. Affordability of 
mobile telephony remains a challenge. While reduction in the cost of devices is driving access, 
pricing of services remain a constraint on the usage, particularly when affected by regressive 
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special taxes levied on communications and equipment, which is as high as 30% in Uganda. As 
such pricing remains the key focus on the regulatory agenda.
The broadband market is still in its infancy with Internet use mainly through work or school. 
Household Internet access remains pitiful. These poor showings can partly be attributed to the high 
cost of bandwidth due to the limited infrastructure backbone. Until 2009, most countries had 
limited connectivity, mainly through SAT3, owned by some of the larger incumbent operators on 
the continent through a club consortium. In many instances incumbent operators had a monopoly 
over international data gateways as well. Where operators, other than incumbent fixed-line 
operators, were allowed to use VSAT or other satellite connectivity, it at had been at a high cost, 
which therefore limited access to services. The landing of the SEACOM cable provided much 
needed bandwidth capacity and reduced the cost of services in terms of dollars per MB. There are 
extensive plans by NEPAD to connect the interior of the continent to the cables. Mobile operators, 
unwilling to wait for these and other backbones to be built, are playing a key role in the roll-out of 
the fibre backbone infrastructure.
Policy and regulatory developments in Africa are highly uneven, with considerable gains in some 
countries, such as the move towards cost-based termination rates, and continued political 
interference in the regulatory processes in others.
Some significant regulatory interventions affected the general perceptions of the 
telecommunications policy and regulatory environment on the continent. In many cases, what is 
attributed to the failure of the regulatory actions, most fundamentally market entry – the main driver 
of competition within the sector – are in fact policy constraints over which the regulator has no or 
little say. Likewise, the regulatory failure to act attributed to the regulator often reflects the institutional 
arrangements and political constraints on its autonomy, for which it is not responsible.
Open market access is a necessary condition to facilitate competition, which in turn is expected to 
drive down prices and access; but the study argues that there are other regulatory factors that 
influence market outcomes, such as interconnection, tariffs regulation, management of scarce 
resources, and taxes and levies.
The management of scarce resources has a direct effect on investment and influences the level of 
competition and innovation. The challenges regarding the effective use of scarce resources relates 
to the lack of reform of out-dated telecommunications policies, which stifles market growth.
High tariffs are a key barrier to the access of services. Tariff regulation across the markets surveyed is 
perceived as ineffective. Generally, high prices are an indication of the lack of competition, as in the 
case of South Africa. In some cases, markets are competitive but prices remained high due to 
taxation, such as in Tanzania and Uganda. In other markets prices are politically determined or set 
through competitive forces such as in Ghana.
Another factor impacting on price and accessibility is interconnection. Although a number of 
countries have had interconnection determinations, this has not meant lower retail pricing. However, 
in countries such as Namibia, where interconnection disputes were addressed through cost-based 
determination, retail prices have decreased and the number of subscribers have increased.
The majority of countries surveyed perceived the regulation of anti-competitive behaviour 
negatively. There has been a rise in competitive disputes as competition has increased through the 
liberalisation process. However, African countries have opened up their markets to competition, 
without completing the telecommunications-reform process. As a result, issues that relate to 
monopolistic practices by incumbent operators, as well as anti-competitive practices by dominant 
operators, are not addressed.
Universal strategies have been adopted across the continent with the aim of increasing access in 
rural and perceived uneconomic areas. As a result, Universal Access Funds (UAFs) have been 
established to meet these objectives. However, most of the UAFs have not been utilised, and in 
cases where the funds have been disbursed the outcomes have been sub-optimal. 
With the liberalisation of the telecommunications market and the increase in the number of 
operators, some countries experienced a decline in the quality of services. In most countries, the 
quality of services has not been a priority for the regulator, while in others regulatory interventions 
have had a limited impact on the quality of services.
Clearly, if Africa is to meet the central policy objective of providing accessible and affordable 
communications services to its citizens, governments are challenged to establish autonomous and 
publicly accountable regulatory regimes that are adequately resourced and skilled to regulate this 
dynamic sector effectively.
Comparative Sector Performance Review 2009/2010
45
Policy and regulatory 
developments in Africa 
are highly uneven, 
with considerable 
gains in some 
countries, such as the 
move towards cost-
based termination 
rates, and continued 






Competitive constraint Enable market entry
High cost of mobile 
calls
High termination rates Cost based call rates
Poor Internet access Poor uptake of connected PC and 
home ownership of PC
High cost of Internet services, 
primarily as result of high network 
costs, particularly international 
bandwidth
Demand stimulation of home PC 
ownership and connectivity.
Ramp up public access focusing on 
schools and IT literacy 
programmes.
Promote international cable and 
terrestrial network competition or 




Lack of infrastructure investment. 
Poor network extension and quality 
of fixed network not suitable or 
available for upgrading.
Most handsets not enabled for 
broadband or are too expensive to 
use for that purpose
Examine investment strategies for 
network extension (public private 
partnerships, structural separation 
of networks and services of 
incumbent) and competition and/ 
or open access strategies.
Ineffective universal 
service strategies
Regulatory bottlenecks regarding 
access and allocation of fund 
money. The absence of processes 
and procedures on how the funds 
should function. The UAS service 
strategies do not take into account 
the converged technology 
environment
Create policies, processes and 
procedures on how the UAS funds 
should function and how fund 
money should be allocated
Address source of 
Expand definition of Universal 








Incomplete reform processes which 
created barriers to market entry
Regulatory barriers to competition 
reinforcing the dominance of 
incumbent operators
Absence of policies addressing 
dominant operators and anti-
competitive behaviour
Remove regulatory barriers to 
competition to enable a non-
discriminatory open access regime
Create policies that address 
dominant users and anti-
competitive behaviour
Lack of infrastructure 
investment. Poor 
network extension 
and quality of fixed 
network not suitable 
or available for 
upgrading.
Most handsets not 
enabled for 
broadband or are too 
expensive to use for 
that purpose.
Absence of regional 
integration
Limited public finances, policy often 
constrain competitive investments 
and alternative funding 
arrangements such as public private 
partnerships often not explored
Remove barriers to investment and 
enable an open access non-
discriminatory regime
The UAS fund must not be 
financed using operator levies but 
through the general tax system
The definition of universal access 
must be expanded to include 
converged technologies and high-
speed broadband infrastructure
Provide incentives to encourage 
investment in underserved and 
perceived uneconomic areas
Lack of regulatory and 
policy capacity
Institutional arrangements constrain 
necessary autonomy of regulator to 
be effective as do their 
competencies and skills in some 
instances, to perform the job
Participatory policy process, 
transparent appointment process, 
public accountability, and 
independent funding 
arrangements
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Appendix
Table 16: RIA countries’ GATS commitments









Cote d’Ivoire 1995 Commitments annexed to the 
Fourth Protocol on Basic 
Telecommunications (from 
1997 onwards)
Committed to the Reference 
Paper on regulatory principles.
Monopoly provision for 10 years for 
voice service over fixed 
infrastructure. 
Open market access was offered for 
all other basic telecom services.
Ghana 1995 Commitments annexed to the 
Fourth Protocol on Basic 
Telecommunications (from 
1997 onwards)
Committed to the Reference 
Paper on regulatory principles.
Committed to maintain duopoly in 
voice telephone services over a 5-
year exclusivity.
Full competition in data 
transmission, Internet and Internet 
access.
Commitment on mobile services 
with the reservation that cross-
border voice services can only be 
supplied through commercial 
arrangements with the duopoly 
operators.
Ethiopia /
Kenya 1995 Uruguay Round Commitments




Until 2003, monopoly on supply of 
services in Nairobi as well as on 
supply of International gateway 
facilities services, and resale in 
monopoly areas only with 
permission of supplier of 
underlying services and facilities. 




Nigeria 1995 Uruguay Round Commitments





Senegal 1995 Uruguay Round Commitments




Commitments annexed to the 
Fourth Protocol on Basic 
Telecommunications (from 
1997 onwards)
Committed to the Reference 
Paper on regulatory principles.
Offered to license additional 
operators when monopoly rights 
expired between 2003 and 2006. 
The number of operators is limited 
to three in the following services: 
paging and trunked radio systems. 
Up to two cellular mobile operators 
had to be licensed during 1997. 
Authorities had to establish in 1997 
the maximum number of licenses 
for mobile satellite services. 
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South Africa 1995 Uruguay Round Commitments




Commitments annexed to the 
Fourth Protocol on Basic 
Telecommunications (from 
1997 onwards)
Committed to the Reference 
Paper on regulatory principles.
Committed to end monopoly 
supply and introduce a second 
supplier by the end of 2003 in 
public-switched, facilities-based 
services. Committed to review the 
feasibility of allowing additional 
suppliers of public switched 
services by the end of 2003. Also 
committed to duopoly supply of 
mobile cellular telephony. No 
limitations on the number of 
suppliers of paging, personal radio 
communication and trunked radio 
systems. Foreign investment in 
telecom suppliers limited to 30%. 
Offered to liberalize resale services 
sometime between 2000 and 2003. 
Tanzania 1995
Tunisia 1995 Commitments annexed to the 
Fourth Protocol on Basic 
Telecommunications (from 
1997 onwards).
It did not undertake any 
regulatory commitments
Competition telex and packed 
switched data from 1999; in mobile 
telephone, frame relay, paging and 
teleconferencing from 2000; in local 
telephone services from 2003. For 
all services, foreign equity limited to 
49%. From 2002, foreign 
participation in the capital of Tunis 
Telecom had to be allowed up to 
10%.
Uganda 1995 Unilateral or new accession 




International basic voice telephony 
traffic must be carried through 
networks of the duopoly major 
licence holders and other pre-
existing licence holders. Neither 
Uganda Telecom Limited (UTL) nor 
its affiliates shall hold interests in 
the Second National Operator 
(SNO) or its affiliates nor shall SNO 
or its affiliates hold ownership in 
the UTL or its affiliates. 
Zambia 1995
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